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I. INTRODUCTION

Much has been written regarding the tax benefit rule (the Rule).'
Most of it has been incorrect. This article will explain why.

Because the Rule is both attractively simple and intuitively correct
even to a layman - an attack on it seems almost insane. If a
taxpayer recovers an item he beneficially deducted, he should pay tax
-

on the recovery. Who could disagree with that? Read on, for this
humble author disagrees - not with the obvious equity or sensibility
of the Rule, but with its fundamental underpinnings.
Too often the Rule has been viewed as naturally evolving from the

inequities of an annual, rather than transactional, tax system.2 As a
result, courts applied the Rule broadly to correct many transactional
inequities. I agree with this general view; however, I limit it signifi-

cantly. I see the Rule as the necessary result of a tax system used
to accomplish policy goals other than the raising of revenue. Such a
policy oriented system often artificially defines income and expenses
in a manner inconsistent with economic reality.3 I view the tax benefit
rule as an additional artificial device necessary to overcome transactional inequities resulting from the use of the tax system to achieve
such non-revenue raising policy goals. However, I suggest that the

1. See generally Cunningham, Characterizationof Income Recovered Under the Tax Benefit
Doctrine, 7 VA. TAx REV. 121 (1987); Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and Transactional
Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAX L. REV. 473 (1984); Plumb, The Tax Benefit
Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1943); Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Tomorrow, 57 HARv.
L. REV. 675 (1944); Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3 TAX L. REV. 329 (1948);
Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure
for the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV. 995, 999-1010 (1968).

2. See, e.g., Hillsboro Natl Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 377 (1983) (stating "strict
adherence to an annual accounting system would create transactional inequities" and explaining
that the tax benefit rule is often a solution for such problems).
3. Willis, Masks, Magic and Games: The Use of Tax Law as a Policy Tool, 4 Am. J. TAx
POL"Y 41 (1985). As a result of such artificial definitions, the system breeds many problems,
only a few of which are solvable by the artificiality of the tax benefit rule. Other problems
include economic distortions and distrust of the system. Id.
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Rule is unnecessary, and in fact harmful, when used to correct those
transactional inequities which are not a result of a policy-oriented goal.
In attacking the judicially created Rule, 4 this article will not leave
a gaping hole in tax theory. Instead, it will explain how Congress has
already fostered a better solution for most of the transactional problems the Rule attempts to solve. The article will then show how the
courts have misunderstood and therefore not applied the congressional
solutions.
A.

Outline

The article will initially survey the history of the Rule's two arms
and the important historical exceptions to the inclusionary arm of the
Rule. Next, the article will survey other error correction devices found
in the Code and in case law, and will elucidate analogous and sometimes
superior solutions to the problems covered by the Rule.
The article will then focus more closely on section 13415 of the
Internal Revenue Code. The converse of the Rule, section 1341 arose
parallel to the Rule. While the Rule generally applies to recoveries
of deductions, section 1341 applies to restorations of inclusions. The
article will demonstrate that section 1341 treats restorations more
clearly and more cleverly than the Rule treats recoveries. Because
restorations resemble the rough opposite of recoveries, section 1341
treatment offers important insight into the Rule and into the Rule's
fallacies.
The main body of the article will then cover three topics. First,
it will discuss the tax benefit rule in relation to reasonable mistakes
of fact. The article will show that the Rule is unnecessary in this area.
Next, the article will discuss the tax benefit rule in relation to unreasonable mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. The article will also
show that the Rule is unnecessary in this area.
Lastly, the article will discuss the Hillsboro expansion of the Rule.
The article will show that the Court based this expansion on flawed
precedent - flawed because the earlier version of the Rule was unnecessary. It will also show that although the Court legislated an
arguably necessary solution, it acted as an unwise legislature. The
article will then recall the analogous error correction devices discussed
earlier. It will show how those analogies suggest a better solution
than that offered by the Court.

4.
5.

Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 377.
I.R.C. § 1341 (1990) (unless otherwise stated, all references to the Internal Revenue

Code will be to the 1986 Code, as amended and in effect for 1990).
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B.

A Statement of the Rule

The tax benefit rule has two arms: the exclusionary arm and the
inclusionary arm.6 The exclusionary arm is statutory and sensible. The
inclusionary arm is judge-made and often unnecessary. Unfortunately,
the two are easily confused. The exclusionary arm of the Rule appears
in section 111(a) of the Internal Revenue Code: "Gross income does
not include income attributable to the recovery during the taxable
year of any amount deducted in any prior taxable year to the extent
such amount did not reduce the amount of tax imposed by this chapter. ' 7 Critically, the exclusionary arm of the Rule only excludes income
otherwise included. Section 111 itself does not deal with income inclusion, which is the province of section 61.
The inclusionary arm of the Rule arose from a line of judicial
decisions. 8 It historically provided: Gross income includes income attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of any amount
deducted or excluded in any prior taxable year to the extent the
taxpayer benefited from the prior deduction or exclusion.9 Arguably,

6.

Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 405 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. I.R.C. § 111(a) (emphasis added). The exclusionary arm originally arose in the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, the predecessor to the Internal Revenue Service. Gen. Couns. Mem.
18,525, 1937-1 C.B. 80 (1937). It fulfilled a sense of equity: a taxpayer should not be taxed on
the portion of a recovery not previously beneficially deducted. After a governmental retreat
and conflicting cases, Congress enacted the forerunner of § 111 in 1942: section 116(a). See
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (wherein
Justice Stevens discussed the history of the tax benefit rule).
Note the requirement of a "recovery" for the § 111(a) exclusionary rule to apply. This
requirement was historically consistent with the similar "recovery" requirement of the inclusionary rule. Compare, however, the lack of a "recovery" requirement in the inclusionary rule
adopted by the Supreme Court in Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381-91. See infra notes 13-15 & 82-94
and accompanying text.
The change in the Court-created inclusionary rule, without a corresponding change in the
congressionally-created exclusionary rule, raises the same issues of fairness and equity which
prompted the adoption of the exclusionary rule in 1942. The inclusionary rule itself is equitable:
taxpayers should not benefit from a deduction if they recover the item deducted or, since
Hillsboro, act inconsistently with the deduction. Such an equitable inclusionary rule - if it
must apply - should not include income corresponding to a non-beneficial deduction. Thus the
Hillsboro rejection of the "recovery" requirement necessitates a change in § 111(a) to similarly
delete the "recovery" requirement.
8. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 377. Naturally the inclusionary arm arose because the government
proposed it. Courts quickly embraced the doctrine, which preceded the exclusionary arm.
9. The textual statement is a paraphrase of the combined exclusionary and inclusionary
rules, as applied from roughly 1942 until the Court's decision in United States v. Bliss Dairy,
Inc., 460 U.S. 370, 395-403 (1983) which discarded the "recovery" requirement. Bliss Dairy was
the companion case to Hillsboro, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). The Court previously continued the
recovery requirement in Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1970). Justice Stevens, concur-
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the inclusionary arm of the Rule is facially superfluous because section
61'' of the Internal Revenue Code includes all income from whatever
source derived (the maximum reach permitted by the sixteenth amendment)." Consequently, the inclusionary Rule does not tax anything
not already taxed by section 61. Nevertheless, courts and commentators have universally treated the Rule as an inclusionary device.'"
As will become evident below, the Rule more properly should be
viewed as an error-correcting device - and an unfortunate one at that.
Since the joint 1985 Supreme Court decisions in HillsboroNational
Bank v. Commissioner's and United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. ,'4 the
inclusionary arm of the Rule now provides: Gross income results from
events which are fundamentally inconsistent with the deduction or
exclusion of an item by the taxpayer in any prior taxable year, to the
extent the taxpayer benefited from the prior deduction or exclusion. '1
II.

HISTORY OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE

Commentators16 universally accept that the tax benefit rule arose
early in our tax history.'7 It is also universally accepted that the Rule

ring in Hillsboro and dissenting in Bliss Dairy, accused the majority of treading new ground
without any congressional lead: "Since there has been no legislation since Nash suggesting that
our approach over the past half-century has been wrong-headed . . . the new doctrine that
emerges from today's decision is of the Court's own making." Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 412 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In his sharply worded dissent, Justice Stevens further noted
that Congress had rejected proposed 1975 legislation which would have accomplished the Bliss
Dairy result. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 421 n.32.
Although the wisdom of a "recovery" requirement is not the exact focus of this article, it
nevertheless is relevant to my analysis and proposals. The inclusionary tax benefit rule, if
limited per my suggestions, would not contain a recovery requirement. To be fair, the § 111(a)
recovery requirement should be deleted.
10. I.R.C. § 61. Section 61 provides: "[G]ross income means all incomefron whatever source
derived ...." Id. (emphasis added).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." Id. (emphasis added).
12. See generally supra note 1.
13. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
14. Id. at 395 (Bliss Dairy was the companion case to Hillsboro).
15. Bliss Dairy, 460 U.S. at 381-91. I cite to Bliss Dairy rather than to Hillsboro because
the Court used the Bliss Dairyfacts to replace the "recovery" requirement with the "fundamental
inconsistency" requirement.
16. Several good articles cover the history of the Rule. See supra note 1. Likewise, Justice
Stevens ably covered the history of the Rule in his well-reasoned dissent to the Bliss Dairy
case. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 403, 405-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Readers unfamiliar with that
history should consult such sources.
17. See sources cited supra note 1.
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clearly arose from a sense of equity: if a taxpayer recovered an item
previously deducted, he should include it as income. Otherwise, the
government would lose revenue. Similarly, no one18 disputes that the
Rule is the natural evolution of an annual, as opposed to a transactional, accounting system.
A. Annual Versus TransactionalAccounting
Because the United States tax system uses an annual theory, it
considers each year separately. While such a system allows for regular
collection of revenue, it also prompts accusations of harshness: a multiyear transaction can result in taxation of early year revenues despite
ultimate and composite transactional losses.
1. Example One
Suppose Taxpayer enters into a business transaction spanning two
years. In year one, Taxpayer receives income of $100,000 and neither
incurs nor pays any expenses. In year two, Taxpayer incurs expenses
of $150,000. Despite the transactional loss of $50,000, Taxpayer must
report $100,000 gross income in year one and a $150,000 loss in year
two.
At this point the example violates the mathematical rule that a
total equals the sum of its parts. For tax purposes the $50,000 transactional loss is not the equivalent of $100,000 income in one year less
a $150,000 loss in another year. Changing tax rates, brackets, and
characterization rules plus the time value of money provide a few
examples of the obvious reasons for the lack of equivalence.
Similarly, the taxpayer may deduct losses incurred in prior annual
tax periods despite composite transactional profits. Nevertheless, the
seminal Supreme Court cases of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. 19 in
1931, and North American Oil v. Burnet2o in 1932 held that each year
constitutes a distinct period. Unless one of a current myriad of exceptions applies, neither the taxpayer nor the government may properly
look back at a prior period to determine current income or losses on
a transactional basis.
2. Sanford & Brooks
During the years 1913 through 1915, Sanford & Brooks engaged
in a business that lost $176,271.88. In 1920, the company recovered
18. The author suggests that the use of the tax system to achieve non-revenue-raising
policy goals is also critically important to the evolution of the Rule.

19. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
20. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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the $176,271.88, plus interest, as a result of a lawsuit.21 The company
argued, and the court of appeals held,- that the $176,271.88 recovery
did not constitute income because the transaction, viewed as a whole,
did not produce a profit. The appellate court, however, conditioned
its decision on the company's amendment of its prior returns to remove
the $176,271.88 of losses. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
each year must be considered separately.- The Court determined that
the government's need for a steady source of revenue justifies an
annual accounting system, rather than one based on transactions. ?
Applying annual accounting, the Court found that the company's
$176,271.88 in losses clearly reflected total annual income during the
years 1913 through 191-5. Similarly, the company's recovery in 1920
of $176,271.88 plus interest clearly reflected its annual income for
1920. The Court found no significance in the fact that the two amounts,
when viewed as a composite transaction, negated each other.?
The Court also found that the recovery constituted an accession
to wealth, and thus income, regardless of the company's prior deductions, or any benefits such deductions may have provided. 26 This portion of the Court's holding is significant in relation to the later-created
inclusionary arm of the Rule. The Sanford & Brooks Court found no
need for such a Rule; instead, it found that the recovery constituted
income under the predecessor to section 61.
3. North American Oil
Following Sanford & Brooks by sixteen months, the Supreme Court
in North American Oil favorably discussed a theory consistent with
the holding in Sanford & Brooks, but based on nearly opposite facts.2
During 1917, the company received $171,979.22 in disputed payments.
At the time of receipt the company had unfettered use of the money;
however, it knew that it might have to return the money in a later
year as a result of pending litigation. The litigation became final in
1922 when the company finally knew that it could keep the money.
North American Oil argued that the $171,979.22 was income either
during 1916 when it first accrued the right to receive the money, or

21. Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 361-62. The work performed was for the United States
government. The lawsuit and judgment were against the government. Id.
22. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 35 F.2d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 1929).
23. Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 367.
24. Id. at 365.
25. Id. at 365-66.
26. Id. at 364.
27. North Am. Oil, 286 U.S. at 420-21.
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in 1922 when it finally felt secure in keeping the funds.? The Court,
however, determined that 1917 was the proper year of inclusion when the company first received the funds and had a claim of right
over them.2 Based upon that holding, the case has since been known
as establishing the "claim of right" doctrine.3 0
Significantly, the Court further explained that even had the company been forced to repay the $171,979.22 in 1922, the analysis would
not change.31 Upon such a hypothetical repayment, the transaction
would have produced no composite profits and instead, would have
resulted in an economic wash. Nevertheless, pursuant to the authority
of Sanford & Brooks, the company in this hypothetical would have
received income of $171,979.22 in 1917 and incurred a loss of
$171,979.22 in 1922. Citing Sanford & Brooks, among other authority,
the Court re-emphasized the annual accounting year and insisted upon
treating each year separatelyY2
The hypothetical 1922 deduction would have been allowed because
the payment would have been an ordinary and necessary business
expense. Thus, even if North American Oil had failed to include the
amount in income in 1917, the subsequent restoration would have been
deductible. Similarly, had Sanford & Brooks failed to deduct the
amount in 1913 through 1915, its subsequent recovery would have
been includable nevertheless. Therefore, the two cases were not early
tax benefit cases; to the contrary, they simply supported the annual
accounting system and the basic policy of treating each year separately.
B.

Statute of Limitations

Arguably, another necessary precursor to the creation of the tax
benefit rule was the statute of limitations. As in many areas of the
law, Congress recognized the need for the conclusion of some matters;
consequently, it enacted a statute of limitations for both refunds and
deficiencies. 3

28.
29.

Id. at 422.
Id. at 423-24.

30. Id. at 424.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 423.
33. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6501 (three-year statute of limitations on assessment of deficiency);
I.R.C. § 6501(e) (six-year statute of limitations on assessment of deficiency involving substantial
omission from gross income); I.R.C. § 6511 (statute of limitations on filing refund generally
three years from return or two years from payment, whichever is longer); I.R.C. § 9531 (statute
of limitations on criminal prosecution).
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Naturally, a statute of limitations can benefit or harm either the
government or the taxpayer. A taxpayer who incorrectly includes
income in a closed year cannot recover the overpaid tax, no matter
how strident his claim. Also, a taxpayer who incorrectly, but honestly,
deducts an item in a closed year need not repay the benefit, no matter
how great the loss in revenue. To provide otherwise would cause the
ceaseless maintenance of records.
Still, to leave such matters uncorrected appears harsh, especially
if the taxpayer later recovers that which he erroneously deducted, or
if he later repays that which he erroneously included. Viewed simply,
the recovery should be income and the repayment should be deductible,
each to counterbalance the prior erroneous deduction or inclusion.
Therein lies the logic of the tax benefit rule, as well as the logic of
its opposite cousin, section 1341,- a section dealing with the restoration
of claims of right.
Courts quickly saw that correction of such errors was stymied by
the annual accounting system as well as by the statute of limitations.
If each year stands alone, then a transaction cannot remain open,
pending a possible recovery or restoration. Instead, taxpayers must
deal with the recovery or restoration when it occurs. Also, under the
strict annual theory of Sanford & Brooks and North American Oil,
the taxpayer need not look back to determine whether either the
government or the taxpayer "got away" with something. Instead, the
system treats a recovery or restoration on its own merits of includibility or deductibility rather than by reference to a prior treatment of
a similar item. Even the discovery of obvious mistakes does not result
in the opening of a closed year for correction.
Nevertheless, courts felt the need for a correction device, especially
one which would respect both the annual system and the statute of
limitations. Not finding one in the Internal Revenue Code [this was
an underlying error that has created years of confusion], the courts,
at the behest of the government, created the previously discussed
inclusionary arm of the tax benefit rule: a recovery of previously
3
deducted items gives rise to income because of the prior deduction. 5
Not long afterward, some courts, 36 and then Congress, recognized that

34. I.R.C. § 1341.
35. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 405 (citing tax benefit cases as early as 1929 and 1931); see also
supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
36. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 406. The Board of Tax Appeals adopted the exclusionary rule,
but other courts rejected it. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Congress
resolved the conflict by enacting § 116(a) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor to § 111. Id.
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the Rule should not tax income if the taxpayer did not receive a
benefit. From that logic came the exclusionary arm of the Rule, and
later section 111. Similar reasoning led to enactment of section 1341,
which controls deductions for the restoration of items previously included pursuant to a claim of right, and the holding in North American
Oil.as
C.

The Erroneous Deduction Exception to the Rule

In addition to the exclusionary Rule, the Tax Court historically
applied an erroneous deduction exception to the inclusionary Rule.
The erroneous deduction exception to the inclusionary tax benefit rule
provides: Gross income does not include income attributable to the
recovery during the taxable year of any amount deducted or excluded
in any prior taxable year, to the extent such deduction or exclusion
39
resulted from an unreasonable mistake of law or fact.

37. I.R.C. § 111 (1990); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
38. See B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS [ 6.3.4
(1981). Prior to the enactment of § 1341, the taxpayer's restoration year deduction was unrelated
in value to the earlier inclusion. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1941). For some
taxpayers, this was beneficial because the deduction was more valuable than the prior inclusion
was detrimental. For other taxpayers, however, the restoration deduction would not fully compensate for the prior detrimental inclusion. Congress enacted § 1341 to ensure that the deduction
would fully compensate for the inclusion. Interestingly, it also chose to allow the deduction
value sometimes to exceed the prior detriment. Thus, with § 1341 as with § 111, Congress
chose to alleviate the harshness of Sanford & Brooks by utilizing a partial re-examination of a
prior year to determine the current year's tax.
39. The textual statement is a paraphrase of the erroneous deduction exception and the
less clear rule defining an "error." Several Tax Court cases have held or stated to the effect
that "the tax-benefit rule does not apply where the original deduction was improper." Mayfair
Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 88 (1971), affd per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.
1972) (stating the general erroneous deduction exception, but ultimately estopping the taxpayer
from asserting the exception); Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1, 8 (1952)
("An erroneous deduction taken in a prior year may not be treated as income of a later year.").
Other cases have explained the circumstances under which a deduction is "improper" or
"erroneous" (The author sees these as synonymous terms.). The author uses the similarly
synonymous term "unreasonable mistake" to represent a deduction which was contrary to information reasonably available to the taxpayer at year end. This is in contrast to deductions which
are ultimately shown to be "erroneous" or "mistaken" based on information which becomes
reasonably available after the close of the year. The author lifts these terms from the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591 (1951). Lewis dealt with an employee
who received a bonus in 1944 and included it on his 1944 return. In 1946, the employer determined
that the employee was not entitled to the bonus and required that he return it. The Court
described the original inclusion as "mistaken" but nevertheless "proper" because the taxpayer
based the inclusion on a "good faith" understanding of the facts available to him. Id. at 591-92.
The information which showed the inclusion to be "mistaken" arose in a later year and thus
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The exception arose from the statute of limitations. The Tax Court
historically recognized that improper deductions should be corrected
in the year of the deduction. If the statute of limitations barred such
a correction, then the Tax Court reasoned that Congress did not
40
support the availability of a correction.
The exception, however, creates an anomaly because taxpayers
can benefit when they act improperly, but not when they act properly.
Under the erroneous deduction exception only proper deductions result
in a benefit that can create later tax benefit income. Improper deductions, despite providing the same benefit as proper ones, do not subject
41
the taxpayer to later potential tax benefit income.
The 1981 decision in Unvert v. Commissioner42 rejected the exception as illogical, at least for cases appealable to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Although the Supreme Court in the Hillsborol
Bliss Dairy'3 cases did not consider the exception, the Court's reasoning is consistent with Unvert.4 As a result, survival of the exception
45
is doubtful.

was properly the basis of a deduction in the later period. Id. Thus, the Court demonstrated
that an item on a return can be reasonably "mistaken" but proper. The author reads from this
case that "unreasonable" mistakes are "improper" or "erroneous." A taxpayer may correct
"unreasonable" mistakes only by an amended return, subject to the statute of limitations.
Streckfus Steamers, 19 T.C. at 8 ("an adjustment [for the erroneous deduction] may be made
only for the year [of deduction], which is barred by the statute of [limitations]").
The Supreme Court's decision in Hillsboro also explained that an apparently proper deduction
can be rendered "improper" in a later year. A taxpayer may correct such a deduction, however,
only in the later year, if at all. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 377. Also, the Tax Court has described
deductions which were "proper" at the time taken, but which later prove to be improper. A
taxpayer may correct such deductions, again, only, if at all, in the later period. See Canelo v.
Commissioner, 53 T.C. 217, 226-27 (1969), affd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971).
40. Streckfus Steamers, 19 T.C. at 8; Canelo, 53 T.C. at 226-27; Unvert v. Commissioner,
656 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining the erroneous deduction exception, although ultimately rejecting it), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982).
41. The Second and Ninth Circuits have rejected the erroneous deduction exception as
"unjust" because it anomalously rewards taxpayers who act improperly. Unvert, 656 F.2d at
486; Askin & Marine Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1933).
42. 656 F.2d 48.3 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982).
43. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 381-91. These combined cases expand the tax benefit rule. See
infra text accompanying notes 81-93.
44. Unvert, 656 F.2d at 483.
45. Interestingly, however, the Bliss Dairy case arose from the Ninth Circuit, as did
Unvert. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Bliss Dairy and in so doing greatly
expanded the Rule. After Bliss Dairy any taxpayer treatment "fundamentally inconsistent"
with a prior deduction gives rise to income. The Court did not recognize any exceptions. Allen
Unvert's exclusion of recovered amounts he had previously deducted as "interest payments"
was surely "fundamentally inconsistent" with the prior deduction.
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Nevertheless, the Tax Court was instinctively correct in creating
the exception, despite its flawed reasoning. The anomaly of errant
taxpayers benefiting while proper taxpayers suffer is facially apparent
but fades under scrutiny. The Tax Court has correctly stated that
improper deductions often appear uncorrectable because of the statute
of limitations. 46 Nevertheless, Congress provided other correction devices to deal with improper deductions, such as the mitigation provisions in sections 1311-1314. 47 Properly applied, these provisions allow
correction of many improper deductions. Without the erroneous deduction exception, however, the mitigation provisions cannot apply as
designed. This crucial point is illustrated below. Unfortunately, the
Tax Court did not articulate this point and thus left its exception open
to attack.
Four cases in particular - three from the Tax Court and one from
the Ninth Circuit - are interesting and will aid in an understanding
of the remainder of this article. The four are Streckfus Steamers, Inc.
v. Commissioner4 in 1952, Canelo v. Commissioner49 in 1969, Mayfair
Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner59 in 1971, and Unvert v. Commissioner5' in 1981. Interestingly, Mayfair Minerals applied an estoppel
exception to the erroneous deduction exception. 5 2 In Unvert, however,
the Ninth Circuit rejected both the estoppel exception and the erroneous deduction exception itself.0 Instead, the court held that the recovery of erroneous deductions results in income under the inclusionary
arm of the Rule.5 In the court's eagerness to resolve the anomaly, it
effectively precluded application of the mitigation provisions as Con5
gress intended. This point is also illustrated below.
1. Streckfus Steamers
On its 1940 federal tax return, Streckfus deducted $2,867.98 in
Illinois sales taxes. The company had not paid the sales tax, but rather

46. See, e.g., Canelo v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 217, 226-27 (1969), affd oi other grounds,
447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court later noted this obvious point, but unfortunately
concluded that the Tax Benefit Rule is an appropriate way to overcome the statutory bar, and
ignored the importance of other correction devices. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 378 n.10.
47. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1990); see also Canelo, 53 T.C. at 227.
48. Streckfus Steamers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1 (1952).
49. 53 T.C. 217 (1969), affd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971).
50. 56 T.C. 82 (1971), affd per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
51. Unvert, 656 F.2d at 483.
52. Mayifair Minerals, 56 T.C. at 88.
53. Unvert, 656 F.2d at 485.
54. Id. at 484-86.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 177-202.
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had accrued it. "0 Such an accrual was not proper because Streckfus
contested the liability. 5 7 In 1943, an Illinois court determined that
Streckfus did not owe the sales tax. 5
The Commissioner alleged that Streckfus realized income in 1943
when the Illinois court relieved the company of the sales tax liability.
The Commissioner did not rely on the discharge of indebtedness
theory, because no real debt ever existed. Instead, the Commissioner
used a tax benefit theory: Streckfus benefited from the prior deduction,
and thus, must pay tax on the "liability" relief."- The Tax Court,
however, did not agree.
Although the court acknowledged the beneficial 1940 deduction, it
found no taxable event in 1943: the taxpayer had merely been relieved
of a liability it never owed. The court explained, "an adjustment may
be made only for the year 1940, which is barred by the statute ....
An erroneous deduction taken in a prior year may not be treated as
income of a later year." 60 The court further explained that no basis
existed to estop Streckfus from asserting the statute of limitation or
from admitting the prior deduction was improper.61
2. Canelo
Canelo was an attorney. He paid various costs owed by his clients
in the form of advancements. The clients agreed to reimburse Canelo
and later did so. Canelo deducted the amounts he paid during certain
tax years prior to 1960. He included the reimbursements received in
62
subsequent years.
The earlier deductions were improper because at the time Canelo
made them, he had a right to reimbursement. Therefore, the amounts
paid should have resulted in a loan representing that right.63 Consequently, the subsequent reimbursement, on its own, did not result
in income because it merely constituted a repayment of a loan: Canelo
received that which he already owned.64
As in Streckfus Steamers, the Commissioner argued the tax benefit
rule: Canelo had income because he recovered an amount previously

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Streckfus Steamers, 19 T.C. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Canelo, 53 T.C. at 218-20.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
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deducted., Critically, the argument did not maintain that the recovered amount was income on its own merits; rather, the argument
required an examination of a prior-year treatment. The court, however, citing Streckfus Steamers,6 applied the erroneous deduction exception to the tax benefit rule. Because Canelo's prior deduction was
improper, no tax benefit issue arose. Instead, the court judged the
recovery on its own merits. With that preface, the court then determined the recovered amount constituted a non-taxable repayment of
a loan.6
Perhaps the Commissioner could have argued that Canelo had no
basis in the right to reimbursement. Such an argument would have
maintained that the capital account basis disappeared when Canelo
deducted the expenses. Critically, the Commissioner did not so argue
the case and therefore, the court did not directly address Canelo's
basis. However, by describing the transaction as a repayment of a
loan,6 the court essentially determined that Canelo had maintained
his basis in the right to reimbursement.
3. Mayfair Minerals
Mayfair Minerals was a producer of natural gas. In 1954 Mayfair
negotiated a contract for the sale of gas at 12 cents per thousand cubic
feet. Such contracts were regulated by the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), which refused to approve Mayfair's contract. Nevertheless,
from 1955 through 1960 Mayfair obtained permission from the FPC
to collect the contract price, with the stipulation that it would refund
any amount in excess of 7.5 cents, if the FPC later required Mayfair
69
to do so.
During 1955 through 1960 Mayfair, therefore, collected the contract
price of 12 cents, included the full amount in gross income, and also
deducted an accrued liability for the potential refunds. The accrued
liabilities exceeded $4 million. During 1960, after litigation, the FPC
rescinded its stipulation with Mayfair and approved the contract price.
As a result, the FPC never required Mayfair to refund any amount. 70
The deductions for accrued but contingent liabilities were clearly er-

65.

Id.

66. Id. (citing Streckfus Steamers, 19 T.C. at 1).
67. Id. at 227.
68. Id. at 226-27. The court never used the phrase "return of capital"; however, it described
the recovery as a return of a loan and as a recovery of that which Canelo "started with." Id.
69. Mayfair Minerals, 56 T.C. at 83.
70. Id.
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roneous. 7' Also, the relief of the liability did not truly give rise to
discharge of indebtedness income because Mayfair did not ever incur
a true debt to pay the refunds. Nevertheless, the Commissioner asserted a deficiency based on the tax benefit rule: Mayfair received a
benefit from the deductions, and therefore, should have income when
the "liability" was discharged.72
The Tax Court analyzed the case in light of Streckfus Steamers.7
The cases were factually almost identical: they each involved improperly accrued, contingent, unpaid liabilities of which a government
agency subsequently absolved the taxpayer. The court, however, did
not apply the erroneous deduction exception of Streckfus. Instead,
the court fashioned an exception to the exception based on estoppel.
Because of the manner in which it had disclosed the deductions, and
because the government was misled by that inaccurate disclosure,
Mayfair was estopped from arguing the invalidity of its deductions. 74
4.

Unvert

During 1969, Alan Unvert paid over $54,000 to a finance company.
He allegedly thought the amount was applied to deductible pre-paid
interest connected to his planned purchase of a condominium. He deducted the payment on his 1969 tax return. Unvert never purchased
the condominium; consequently, he received a refund of the $54,000
in 1972. He did not report the refund on his 1972 return, apparently
taking the position that the amount represented a non-taxable return
of capital. In 1976, long after the statute of limitations had expired
for 1969, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency for 1972 asserting that the 1972 refund was taxable pursuant to the tax benefit rule. 75
The 1969 deduction was erroneous. The "payment" merely represented a deposit and thus was non-deductible because Unvert could
not "pay" interest he did not owe. Unvert himself maintained that
the deduction was erroneous; neither the Tax Court nor the Ninth

71. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 284 (1944); Dixie Pine
Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944), both cited by Mayfair Minerals "for
the proposition that contingent liabilities are not properly deductible.
Mayfair Minerals,
56 T.C. at 88.
72. Mayfair Minerals, 56 'P.C. at 85-86.
73. Id. at 87-88.
74. Id. at 88-94. Although the Tax Court invoked the equitable doctrine of estoppel in
Mayfair Minerals, it is also interesting to note that the Tax Court has maintained that it lacks
equitable jurisdiction and thus cannot apply, for example, the doctrine of equitable recoupment.
See infra note 153.
75. Unvert, 656 F.2d at 484.
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Circuit disagreed. However, rather than apply the Streckfus Steamers
erroneous deduction exception to the tax benefit rule, the Tax Court
chose to apply the estoppel rule.7 6
As a result, Unvert was estopped from arguing the true nature
of the 1969 deduction. Left with no argument tending to prove the
1969 error, the court effectively found that the "erroneous" payment
actually constituted a proper deduction. Consequently, the erroneous
deduction exception did not apply and the court applied the traditional
tax benefit rule.7
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the result,
but altered the reasoning. 78 In applying the tax benefit rule, the court
did not first determine whether the initial deduction was erroneous
and then whether estoppel should apply. Instead, the court rejected
the erroneous deduction exception, claiming that it represented poor
public policy.79 The court questioned the Tax Court's fairness in subjecting taxpayers who take proper deductions to the Rule but exempting taxpayers who take improper deductions from its application. The
court, thus, greatly expanded the Rule by applying it to recoveries
of erroneous deductions.
D.

FurtherExpansion of the Rule

The Supreme Court, in the 1983 Bliss Dairy decision,80 further
expanded the Rule greatly by applying it to taxpayer actions "fundamentally inconsistent" 8, with prior tax benefits. The expanded Rule
no longer requires a "recovery" of anything. 2 As explained later, it
may not - and probably should not - even require a traditionally
taxable transaction.
Bliss Dairy, Inc. deducted the full cost of cattle feed purchased
during its fiscal year 1973. Such a deduction by a cash method taxpayer was clearly proper in advance of the time the cattle consumed
the feed, even though much of the feed was unconsumed at the end
of the year. During the following fiscal year Bliss Dairy, Inc. adopted

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807, 812-18 (1979).
Id. at 818.
Unvert, 656 F.2d at 485 n.1.
Id. at 486.
United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. was the companion case to Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 370.
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 385.
Id. at 381-83.

83. Id. at 374.
84.

See id. at 384, n.17; Zaninovich v. Commissioner, 616 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1980).
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a plan of liquidation and distributed its assets, including the remaining
cattle feed, to its shareholders., Pursuant to then section 336,'1 the
corporation properly reported no gain or loss as a result of the liquidation.7
The shareholders, electing under section 333,- limited their respective gains from the liquidation to their respective shares of accumulated earnings and profits plus boot received in excess of such respective shares. Pursuant to section 334(c),89 the shareholders' bases in
the assets received were set as a share of their respective bases in
the cancelled stock plus the limited gain recognized.
Although the record did not reflect the amount, the Court presumed that the shareholders "t[ook] a basis greater than zero in the
feed
. [and] in turn deducted their basis in the feed as an expense
of doing business under section 162." 9
The government understandably was scandalized at the apparent
double deduction of the cattle feed - once by the corporation and
then again by the shareholders. It therefore argued that the tax benefit
rule should apply to tax the corporation on the distribution of the
feed. 91 The Court agreed.92
Application of the Rule, however, required a new expansive interpretation. Traditionally, the Rule applied to a recovery of a previously deducted item. However, the Court explained that prior cases
also contained language which would apply the Rule to events merely
"inconsistent" with the prior treatment.9 3 Thus, the majority clearly
rejected the "recovery" requirement: a requirement that had earlier
formed the rationale for applying the Rule.9
III.

ERROR CORRECTION DEVICES

In addition to the tax benefit rule, several other error correction
devices exist in tax theory. Some are creations of Congress, while
others, like the Rule, are creations of the courts.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 374.
I.R.C. § 336 (1973).
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 375.
I.R.C. § 333 (1973); see Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 375 n.5.
I.R.C. § 334(c) (1973); see Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 376 n.6.
Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 376.
Id. at 376-77.
Id. at 395-403.
Id. at 383-87.
Id. at 381.
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A.
B.
C.

The correction devices fall into three categories:
inexact correction;
approximate correction; and
full, or almost full, correction.
A. Inexact CorrectionDevices
1. Tax Benefit Rule

The tax benefit rule is an example of inexact correction. When
applicable, the Rule creates current income equal to the amount of a
beneficial prior deduction. While that may appear to be exact, it is
not, for it omits several important collateral considerations such as
the time value of money, the effect of penalties, the prior statute of
limitations, changing tax rates, changing tax brackets, changing tax
character, filing status, and the effect of the prior deduction and current inclusion on other items. In many cases, such collateral considerations can have a greater impact than does the raw inclusion.
2. Example Two
Suppose that taxpayer in year one deducted $10,000 in local taxes
which she thought she owed. In year three, taxpayer received a refund
of the $10,000. Pursuant to the Rule, she included the $10,000 refund
in income in year three. Suppose further that year one tax rates were
70% at the margin, while year three rates were 28% at the margin.
As a result of the deduction, taxpayer saved $7000 in taxes and
had the use of that $7000 for two years. As a result of the inclusion
in year three, taxpayer only paid an extra $2800 in taxes.
In this simple example, the taxpayer actually benefited by $4200
[$7000 minus $2800] as a result of his incorrect deduction, despite the
correction. In addition, she had use of the $7000 for two years. In
the alternative, if tax rates were to increase between the deduction
and correction years, the taxpayer could instead pay more in taxes
as a result of the correction than she ever saved from the deduction.
3. Example Three
Consider a taxpayer who deducted $60,000 in trade or business
expenses from his $100,000 salary. He thus had $40,000 in adjusted
gross income 95 and a $40,000 contribution base 96 for charitable contribution deductions.

95.

I.R.C. § 62(a)(1), § 162.

96.

I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(F).
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Any contributions of non-capital assets given to public charities in
excess of $20,000 would be disallowed9 and carried over to the following year. 98 If not deducted within five years, the contribution deduction
would be lost.Suppose the taxpayer recovered the $60,000 in the sixth year.
Under the traditional Rule, the recovery would result in $60,000 income and thus a contribution base $60,000 greater than it otherwise
would have been. As a result, the taxpayer might deduct charitable
contributions in the sixth year that otherwise would be carried over
and potentially lost.
Similarly, a deduction from gross income may have many other
collateral consequences, affecting areas such as medical expense deductions,1° at risk rules,"" hobby losses,'- and passive activity deductions. 103 Subsequent recovery inclusions will likewise affect such areas
in the recovery year. As illustrated in the above example, often the
deduction effect will not equal the inclusion effect.-r
Thus, the tax benefit rule results in an inexact correction. Ideally,
a taxpayer would correct a recovered deduction by repaying the actual
tax saved, with interest. The Rule does not even attempt to approximate that ideal.

97. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), (C).
98. I.R.C. § 170(d)(1).
99. I.R.C. § 170(d)(1).
100. I.R.C. § 213. Section 213 allows medical expense deductions "to the extent that such
expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income." Id. Thus, § 213 is another deduction
which is a function of adjusted gross income. For example, a decrease in adjusted gross income
could cause allowed medical deductions to increase: when adjusted gross income is smaller, the
taxpayer can more easily exceed the 7.5% floor. Likewise, an includible recovery would later
increase adjusted gross income and consequently hinder the taxpayer in exceeding the floor.
101. I.R.C. § 465.
102. I.R.C. § 183. Section 183 disallows deductions attributable to an activity "not engaged
in for profit." Id. Section 183(d) presumes that "[i]f the gross income derived from an activity
for 3 or more of the taxable years in the period of 5 consecutive taxable years which ends with
the taxable year exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity ... then ... such activity
[is] ... an activity engaged in for profit." Id. Thus, a particular deduction may cause an activity
to be not engaged in for profit for a period of five years, thereby causing the disallowance of
many deductions. A later recovery many years later could similarly cause the activity to be
"engaged in for profit" for a different five-year period, thereby causing the allowance of a
different set of deductions.
103. I.R.C. § 469.
104. Cf. Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Tramactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REV. 85 (1972). Professor Rabinovitz
discussed a similar analysis as applied to § 1341, involving inclusions of items which were later
restored and thereby deducted. fie demonstrated that the collateral consequences of the inclusion
may be different from the collateral consequences of the later deduction.
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4.

Depreciation Recapture

Sections 1245105 and 12501°6 also act as inexact error correction
devices. Accelerated depreciation constitutes a congressionally
sanctioned "error ' 10' because it permits depreciation deductions faster
than economic reality would justify. Taxpayers who hold the property
throughout its useful life ultimately see the economic value of the
asset equal its tax value. Thus, they never need correct the "error."
In contrast, taxpayers who dispose of a depreciated asset while it
retains significant economic value must recapture the excessive depreciation.108 The corrective nature of the recapture rules is both evident
and justifiable because such a taxpayer received a tax incentive rapid depreciation - for using an asset which the taxpayer ultimately

did not fully use.
The "correction," however, is inexact. Through the basis
mechanism of sections 1012109 and 1016,110 the taxpayer will reduce
basis by the amount of the depreciation taken."' On disposition, he
incurs taxable gain equal to the amount by which the remaining
economic value of the asset exceeded the adjusted basis.1 2 This gain
includes an amount equal to any "excessive"' depreciation. That por-

105. I.R.C. § 1245.
106.

I.R.C. § 1250.

107. The "error" is analogous to the "mistake" Justice Black described in United States v.
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 591 (1951). In Lewis, the taxpayer received a bonus which he thought he
could keep. Thus it was taxable income. In a later year, the taxpayer was required to refund
the money. The Court held the original inclusion was proper, albeit "mistaken." Similarly,
accelerated depreciation is proper under the statute, but it is "erroneous" in an economic sense.
Id. at 592.
108. I.R.C. § 1001. Section 1001 would require inclusion of the amount realized from the
disposition of the property to the extent it exceeded basis. Id. Section 1016 would have reduced
basis by the amount allowed as depreciation. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2). To the extent that accelerated
depreciation exceeded economic depreciation, the basis would be less than the economic value
of the property, and in turn the amount realized on disposition. Section 1245, if applicable,
would characterize as ordinary income the portion of such gain resulting from depreciation.
I.R.C. § 1245. Section 1250, if applicable, would characterize as ordinary income the portion of
such gain resulting from accelerated depreciation, to the extent it exceeded straight line depreciation. I.R.C. § 1250.
109. I.R.C. § 1012. Section 1012 provides for a cost basis. Id.
110. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2). Section 1016 reduces basis by the greater of either the amount
allowed or allowable as depreciation. Id.
111. Id. Basis must be reduced by the amount allowable if greater than the amount allowed.
112. In an arm's length transaction, the amount realized on disposition would equal the
economic value of the thing transferred. See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States,
126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
113. Excessive is used here in the sense that depreciation taken exceeds economic deprecia-
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tion of the depreciation correction operates much like the tax benefit
rule. It permits a deduction in one year, at that year's bracket and
with that year's collateral effects. For correction, the basis mechanism
results in later income equal to the excessive deduction, but at the
later year's bracket and with the later year's collateral effect. The
depreciation recapture provisions provide greater accuracy because
they characterize some of the correction income as ordinary income
4
to counterbalance the earlier deduction against ordinary income.'
Just as with the tax benefit rule, a taxpayer taking excessive
depreciation may benefit more from the deduction than he suffers
from the correction. Or, in a time of rising tax rates or an instance
of significant collateral effects, he may suffer much more from the
correction than he ever benefited from the deduction.
My point is not to criticize depreciation recapture for being inexact.
A more exact correction mechanism might be more cumbersome than
the benefits it would engender would justify. Recognition of its imprecision, however, helps place the Rule in the context of the many error
correction devices found in tax law.
5.

Tufts and Crane

Commissioner v. Tufts ' 5 is a judicially created error correction
device which corrects the judicially sanctioned errors of the Crane v.
Commissioner- decision. Crane and its progeny effectively permit a
taxpayer to include in basis amounts which result from non-recourse
liabilities." 7 As a result, such taxpayers receive significant tax benefits
with no economic investment. Although the Crane opinion has been
criticized," s it has also become entrenched.
As a consequence, the Tufts decision requires that a taxpayer
include the relief from non-recourse liabilities in the amount realized

114. See supra note 108. Section 1250 would characterize only a portion of the "excessive"
depreciation as ordinary. Thus, Congress chose an inexact correction device. I.R.C. § 1250.
115. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
116. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
117. Crane held that a taxpayer must include in amount realized the relief of nonrecourse
debt. Id. at 13. The Court also implied that a taxpayer's basis would be a function of nonrecourse
debt assumed or incurred at acquisition. Id. at 11-12. Crane's basis, however, actually arose
under the predecessor to section 1014, which sets the basis for inherited property. Thus, the
Court's statements regarding basis were dicta. The First Circuit in Parker v. Delaney, 186
F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951), held that the taxpayer's cost basis
was a function of nonrecourse acquisition indebtedness.
118. See, e.g., Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAx L.
REV. 277 (1978); Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUm. L.
REV. 1498 (1982).
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calculation, even if the liabilities exceed the fair market value of the
disposed asset. 119 Logically, a taxpayer cannot have income from the
relief of a liability he had neither the obligation nor the incentive to
pay. 120 Nevertheless, such a taxpayer would have a windfall if he were
not to include the liabilities in amount realized. Because Crane and
its progeny approved of an erroneous excessive basis for such a taxpayer, Tufts creates an erroneous excessive amount realized.1 2' Thus,
the Tufts decision is not a result of the existence of "true" economic
income; instead, it is a result of an error correction.
Justice O'Connor ably argued in her concurrence to Tufts, that
were she writing on a clean slate, she would question Crane.- However, because Crane has become so entrenched, she supported the
Tufts error correction mechanism.123
The Tufts correction is inexact for the same reasons the tax benefit
rule is inexact. It permits tax benefits in early years, at those years'
brackets and those years' collateral effects. It then results in income
in a later year at a potentially different bracket and with different
collateral effects.
B.

Approximate CorrectionDevice
1. Section 1341

In contrast to the tax benefit rule, section 13411- provides a
mechanism for approximate correction of prior errors. It operates in
situations which are essentially the reverse of tax benefit cases. Instead of involving deductions followed by recoveries, section 1341 involves income recognition followed by a restoration of the income item.
In deference to Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.12 and North
American Oil v. Burnet, 2 6 section 1341 does not correct or alter the
prior year's return. However, in a partial modification of the Sanfordi
North American principles, the section requires an examination of the
prior year to determine the current year's tax. Thus, Congress chose
to modify the "each year stands alone" theory.

119.

Tufts, 461 U.S. at 311.

120. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
121. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 312-13.
122. Id. at 318 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor referred to the "coinvestment"
nature of nonrecourse financing, implicitly questioning the Crane court's policy choice of recognizing nonrecourse debt as real debt. Id.
123. Id. at 320-21.
124. I.R.C. § 1341.
125. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
126. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

2. Mechanics of 1341
In order for section 1341 to apply, the section requires that three
preliminary tests be met. It then provides two alternative methods

of computing the year's tax. First, an item must have been "included
in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) because it appeared
"127
"...
that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item; .
The "appearance" factor is significant. If the taxpayer legitimately
had such an unrestricted right, then 1341 will not apply to a later
restoration of the item. Instead, pursuant to Sanford & Brooks and
North American Oil the income and restoration would each stand
alone. The taxpayer would determine their respective tax consequences without reference to the other. Thus, in a sense, the original
inclusion must have been erroneous. The error, however, must have
been reasonable - it must have "appeared" correct, even though it
was erroneous. If the taxpayer knew or should have known that the
item did not produce income, then section 1341 again would not apply
because the inclusion would not have appeared correct. In such an
event, proper correction would be by way of amendment of the inclusion year return to correct the unreasonable error. In this sense,
section 1341 is analogous to the Tax Court version of the tax benefit
inclusionary rule: it does not apply to unreasonable mistakes.'21 Instead, each only applies to items the taxpayer thought were correctly
treated, but were in fact incorrect.
Second, a deduction for the restoration must be allowable for the
restoration year "because it was established after the close of such
prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; .... 129 This
requirement reinforces the above notion that the inclusion must have

127. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1) (emphasis added). Note the reference to an "unrestricted right to
such item." This requirement is comparable to the North Am. Oil standard of a "claim of right
•.. without restriction as to its disposition." North Am. Oil, 286 U.S. at 424. I see no difference
between the two standards.
128. Streckfus Steamers, 19 T.C. at 1; see supra text accompanying notes 39-79.
129. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(2). Note two interesting aspects of this language. First, the deduction
must be allowable for the current year. Implicitly, some code section other than § 1341 must
allow the deduction. Thus, § 1341 is merely an error correction section and itself allows nothing.
Second, the allowance by some other section must occur in the current year "because [the
relevant facts generating the allowance were] . . . established after the close of such prior
taxable year." Id. This language is consistent with the Sanford & Brooks/North Am. Oil standard
that each year stands alone. See supra text accompanying notes 19-32. Because the facts would
be established after the close of the prior year, they cannot affect the prior year and must
instead be considered in the year they are established.
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resulted from a reasonable mistake. Lastly, the amount of the deduction must exceed $3,000.130
If the section applies, the taxpayer must compute his tax according
to the lesser of two methods. First, the taxpayer must compute his
tax by deducting the restoration without reference to the consequences
of the prior reasonably erroneous inclusion.131 In the alternative
method, the taxpayer initially computes his tax without deducting the
restoration. 132 Then, applying the second method, he must recompute
his tax for the prior year. 13
This recomputation requires the taxpayer to look back at the prior
year, but not to actually amend the tax return. The taxpayer must
compute the prior year tax return amount as if the item had not been
included. Such a computation requires a refiguring of any collateral
item which the exclusion of the reasonably erroneous inclusion would
have affected.'3 Examples include charitable deductions'3 and medical
expense deductions, 3 6 which are each a function of adjusted gross
income.137
3.

Example Four

Suppose Taxpayer receives $200,000 during year one believing'that
he is entitled to retain the money without restriction. Taxpayer includes the $200,000 in gross income. As a result, his contribution base
for charitable contributions also equals $200,000. He then deducts
$100,000 in contributions he made to public charities. Year one tax
rates equal 50% of taxable income. Taxpayer therefore pays $50,000
tax.

130.

I.R.C. § 1341(a)(3).

131. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4). The section requires computation of the current year's tax "computed with such deduction." Id. Because this specific provision does not refer back to the prior
consequences of the then proper but now "erroneous" inclusion, such consequences would be
irrelevant under the rule of Sanford & Brooks/North Am. Oil.
132. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5)(A).
133. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5)(B).
134. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(d)(4)(ii) (1990) provides:
No item other than the exclusion of the income previously included under a claim
of right shall be considered ....

However, if the amounts of other items in the

return are dependent upon the amount of adjusted gross income, taxable income,
or net income ... appropriate adjustment shall be made as part of the computation
of the decrease in tax.
Id. For an excellent discussion of the collateral effects of the recomputation, see Rabinovitz,
supra note 104.
135. I.R.C. § 170; Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(d)(4)(ii) Ex. (4) (1990).
136. I.R.C. § 213.
137. I.R.C. § 62; Treas. Reg. § 1341-1(d)(4)(ii) (1990).
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Four years later (in year five), Taxpayer discovers that he must
restore $100,000 of the money. He does so and is entitled to a deduction
for $100,000 under section 162. He has other income of $200,000. Year
five tax rates equal 28% of taxable income.
Section 1341(a)(4) requires Taxpayer to compute his year five tax
by deducting the restoration. This computation results in a tax of
$28,000.
Section 1341(a)(5) requires that he compute his year five tax without the deduction for the restoration. This results in a tax of $56,000.
He must then subtract the reduction in tax which would have resulted
had he never included the $100,000 in year one. Taxpayer then must
pay the lesser of the 1341(a)(4) or (a)(5) method.
The year one recomputed income would be $100,000. Taxpayer's
charitable deductions would have been limited to $50,0001-3 because of
the reduced contribution base. 139 However, the disallowed charitable
deduction would have resulted in a carry-over to years two through
six.140 Section 1341(a)(5) would require that taxpayer consider the effect of that carry-over through year four.'14 Assume that taxpayer
had sufficient contribution base in year two to deduct the $50,000
carry-over, and further assume that year two rates were also 50%.
Taxpayer's tax in year one would have been $25,000, resulting in a
reduction of $25,000. His year two tax also would have been reduced
by $25,000 as a result of the carry-over which would have resulted
from the $100,000 exclusion. Thus, the total reduction would be

$50,000.
Under section 1341(a)(5), taxpayer then reduces his year five tax
of $56,000 by the amount of the total $50,000 reduction. This results
in a tax of $6,000. Taxpayer then pays the $6,000 tax because it is
less than the $28,000 which resulted from the simple deduction of the
restored amount.
The above example illustrates some of the complications of section
1341. Note that Taxpayer reduced his tax in the restoration year by
$50,000, which is the exact amount his tax increased in the initial
years as a result of the reasonably erroneous inclusion. The complex
section achieved this result by looking back at the prior year and by
considering the collateral consequences of the inclusion.

138. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A).
139. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(F).
140. I.R.C. § 170(d)(1)(A).
141. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5). The recomputation considers only the effects on prior years. Thus
any amount which would have been available for carry-over to the current year (year five)
would be irrelevant in the hypothetical recomputation.
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Note also that the section 1341(a)(4) method of a simple deduction
roughly compares to treatment under the tax benefit rule and other
inexact correction devices. It reduced income by the exact amount of
the prior inclusion. Because the method does not consider collateral
effects or the effects of rate changes, it resulted in a reduced tax of
$28,000, whereas the prior inclusion resulted in an increased tax of
$50,000. Similarly, the tax benefit rule includes the exact amount of
the prior deduction, but ignores the effects of rate changes or collateral
consequences.
Note further that the section 1341(a)(5) method is only an approximate correction. Although taxpayer reduced his current taxes by the
exact amount of the prior increase, he is not entitled to interest.'14
Also, the section 1341(a)(5) method only applies if it benefits the taxpayer.43 If the taxpayer is better off under the inexact method of
section 1341(a)(4), then that method applies. Thus, the government
cannot utilize the approximate correction device.
C.

Full Correction
1. Mitigation

The income tax mitigation provisions of sections 1311 through
1314144 provide a method of exact correction. The method applies typically if a taxpayer has twice included, excluded, deducted, or failed
to deduct a single item. 45 The method also applies only if the statute
of limitations or some other rule bars correction by some other
method. 146
When applicable, the mitigation rules re-open the prior year in
which the error occurred. 147 That year is then corrected fully with

142. Section 1341(b)(1) provides that the § 1341(a)(5) decrease in tax, if applicable, "shall
be considered to be a payment of tax on the last day prescribed by law for the payment of tax
for the [current] taxable year." Id. Interest, if due, would thus run only from the date of the
hypothetical payment in the fifth year, rather than from the actual payment in the first year.
I.R.O. § 6611(b)(2).
143. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(5). Because § 1341(a) provides that the tax for the current year equals
the lesser" of the tax computed under the two methods, it can never favor the government. Id.
144. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314.
145. I.R.C. § 1312(1)-(4). In addition, § 1312(5)-(7) provide three other circumstances of

adjustment.
146. I.R.C. § 1311(a): "[c]orrection of the effect of the error . . . is prevented by the
operation of any law or rule of law." Id.
147. I.R.C. § 1314.
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regard to the item, including the item's collateral effects.148 As a result,
the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or owes a deficiency with regard
to that prior year. The effects of interest and penalties are then fully
applicable. Thus, the device fully corrects the error.
The mitigation provisions are not a panacea for error correction.
Congress clearly intended that the provisions apply sparingly. 149They
only apply if five150 - and sometimes seven 51 - specific factors exist.
In many instances of double inclusions or deductions, one or more of
the requisite factors is absent. In those instances, the provisions do
not apply and the code offers no method of error correction.
2.

Equitable Recoupment

Occasionally, the judicially created doctrine of equitable recoupment applies.12 It too provides for nearly full correction. Double taxation of a single transaction by a single taxpayer will sometimes trigger
the doctrine. The equitable rule then causes the creation of a second
error in the exact same amount, but in the opposite direction, of the
first error. Thus, if a taxpayer improperly pays tax on a transaction
and must properly pay the tax a second time, the doctrine of equitable
recoupment allows taxpayer to reduce taxpayer's correct tax by the
exact amount of the prior erroneous payment.
Like mitigation, equitable recoupment is not a panacea for the
problems of error correction. The doctrine is confusing in its many
judicially created permutations and rarely applies.'5 Arguably, it no

148. I.R.C. § 1314(a) (emphasis added).
There shall then be ascertained the increase or decrease in tax previously determined which results solely from the correct treatment of the item which was the
subject of the error (with due regardgiven to the effect of the item in the computation of gross income, taxable income, and other matters under this subtitle).
Id.
149. See Maguire, Surrey & Traynor, Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 48 YALE
L.J. 719, 719 (1939) ("Obviously the legislators realized that the section would be a liability
rather than an asset if it were so frequently invoked as to increase the bulk of litigated controversies.").
150. For a discussion of the mechanics of mitigation, see Willis, Some Limits of Equitable
Recoupment, Tax Mitigation, and Res Judicata: Reflections Prompted by Chertkof v. United
States, 38 TAX LAW. 625, 630-33 (1984).
1,51. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 177-202.
152. United States v. Dalm, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990). For a discussion of equitable recoupment,
see Andrews, Modern Day Equitable Recoupment and the Two Tax Effect: Avoidance of the
Statutes of Limitation in Federal Tax Controversies, 28 ARIZ. L. REv. 595 (1986); Willis, supra
note 150, at 633-48.
153. A discussion of the intricacies and permutations of equitable recoupment is beyond
the scope of this article. See supra note 152.
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longer applies to matters involving double income taxation. Instead,
it is likely to apply only when two different types of tax apply to the
same transaction.1T

One point worth noting here is the Tax Court's traditional denial of equitable relief. Rothensies
v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 303 (1946); Commissioner v. Gooch Milling &
Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (1969), which established the Tax Court as an article I court, the Tax
Court clearly did not have equitable jurisdiction. At that time, the court was an agency of the
executive branch and was empowered only to apply the laws of Congress. The 1969 transformation of the Tax Court into a legislative court raises the issue of whether the court presently
possesses equitable jurisdiction. Apparently the court has not yet asserted such jurisdiction
with regard to equitable recoupment. The court, however, has frequently applied the doctrines
of equitable estoppel and tax benefit. See, e.g., Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 82 (1971), affd per curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972). Interestingly, the Claims Court,
also a legislative court, apparently has equitable powers and has considered the doctrine of
equitable recoupment. See Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571, 577-78 (Cl. Ct. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 83 (1973). For a fuller discussion of the Tax Court jurisdiction, see H. DUBROFF,
THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1979).
154. This issue was not before the Supreme Court in its recent decision involving equitable
recoupment, and thus arguably remains unsettled. See Dalm, 110 S. Ct. at 1361. Enacted in
1938, the detailed mitigation circumstances of adjustment were intended to replace the then
existing equitable doctrines, including recoupment. Situations outside the ambit of the seven
(originally five) circumstances of § 1312, however, still lend themselves to recoupment. In nearly
all cases, recoupment will only apply to situations involving double taxation or omission as to
two different taxes - such as income tax and estate tax; income tax and gift tax; or estate tax
and excise tax. It would not generally be appropriate in situations involving double inclusion
or omission as to income tax for such situations would almost always be within the ambit of §
1312. As was explained by Professors Surrey, Maguire, and Traynor in 1939, "The Congressional
purpose . . . can be fully executed only if the statutory solution thus adopted is permitted to
operate exclusively in the classes of cases designated by Congress." Maguire, Surrey & Traynor,
supra note 149, at 774-75. Situations which fail the technical mitigation requirements would
thus not be good candidates for recoupment. The Claims Court has so held at least twice.
Brigham v. United States, 470 F.2d 571, 577 (Cl. Ct. 1972) ("[W]ithin the defined areas to
which the mitigation provisions are addressed, i.e., 1312(1) through 1312(7), the statutory remedy
is exclusive."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973); Gooding v. United States 326 F.2d 988, 995-96
(Cl. Ct. 1964) ("[W]hen Congress established the detailed provisions of the mitigation sections
it intended ... that they supersede any common-law recoupment remedies with respect to the
categories designated in section 1312."), cert. denied. 379 U.S. 834 (1964). See also First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 565 F.2d 507, 516 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Assuming, without deciding, that
the mitigation provisions are the exclusive remedy in the area where they apply ....
").
An exception to this rule of non-applicability to pure income tax matters arose in a 1986
Ninth Circuit case. Kolom v. United States, 791 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1986). The alternative
minimum tax on preference income was twice asserted against the same preference item of a
sole taxpayer. The court found that mitigation was not an appropriate solution because the §
1312(1) circumstance involved double inclusions in "gross income." Instead, the case involved
double inclusions in alternative income. The court then used equitable recoupment as the theory
of recovery. The mitigation analysis was correct. The recoupment analysis was incorrect. Id.
at 769.
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THE TAX BENEFIT RULE: AN ANALYSIS

Viewed in context -- as one of many correction devices - the
modern tax benefit rule is subject to two main criticisms: it is both
overbroad and poorly designed. Other correction devices are better
suited for errors now covered by the Rule. Also, other correction
devices offer more effective correction of the errors.
Current applications of the Rule fall into three classes:
A. reasonable mistakes of fact;
B. unreasonable mistakes of fact and mistakes of law; and
C. proper treatment (no mistakes).
As explained earlier, -5the Tax Court traditionally applied the Rule
only to Class A. The erroneous deduction exception prevented application to Class B. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in the
1981 Unvert15 decision, expanded the Rule to apply to Class B as
well. The Supreme Court in the 1983 Bliss Dairy15 7 decision also expanded the Rule to apply to Class C. The Court was not clear whether
it agreed with the Ninth Circuit regarding application to Class B.
A summary of my argument is:
1. The Rule is unnecessary as to Class A because section 1016
and the basis mechanism of the Code achieve the same result.
2. The Rule is inapplicable to Class B because the Mitigation
provisions - particularly section 1312(7) - apply. If the Rule were
to apply to situations involving unreasonable mistakes of fact or mistakes of law then section 1312(7) would have little meaning. Consequently, for the section to have meaning, the Rule must not apply
to Class B. In addition, section 1312(7) 1' is a better correction device
than is the Rule.

Kolorn would have been a candidate for recoupment, despite the pure income tax nature of
his double taxation. The Ninth Circuit was correct in saying that mitigation does not address
the situation. Thus, in such a limited area, recoupment would be available to a pure income tax
matter. However, as in Dalm, the court allowed recoupment of the wrong tax. Id. at 766.
Originally Kolom paid the minimum tax in 1973. Later the government asserted a deficiency
as to 1972. Kolom petitioned the Tax Court and lost. He then sought refund of the 1973 tax which was improper and by then barred by the statute of limitations. For traditional recoupment
to apply, he should have paid the proper 1972 deficiency and then sought a refund. The District
Court could have granted recoupment of the improper 1973 tax against the proper 1972 tax.
The Tax Court could not. Recoupment of the improper 1973 tax against itself was wrong - or
at least not traditional. It violates the traditional two-wrongs-make-a-right theory. Interestingly,
the Ninth Circuit cited the Seventh Circuit's O'Brien decision as authority. Id. at 765. O'Brien
stands for the opposite proposition. O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1985).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 39-74.
156. 656 F.2d at 483.
157. Bliss Dairy was the companion case to Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 370.
158. I.R.C. § 1312(7).
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3. The Rule should apply only to Class C - the very class to
which it traditionally did not apply. I recommend refinement of the
Rule as to Class C. I also recommend the re-designing of the Rule so
that it provides at least approximate correction such as provided by
section 1341159 or the doctrine of equitable recoupment.
A.

Class A: Reasonable Mistakes of Fact
1. Background

Traditionally Class A is the area to which the tax benefit rule
applied. I classify the area as "Reasonable Mistakes of Fact" because
it involves mistakes which our annual accounting system deems appropriate; hence, they are "reasonable" mistakes.
Under annual accounting, a taxpayer must use information reasonably available at year-end to determine the tax consequences of a
transaction. The annual system considers such a determination appropriate even if information available in a subsequent year shows it to
be mistaken. Thus, the prior deduction, omission, inclusion, or capitalization, although truly mistaken, is reasonable and thus legally correct.
Thus, it is not subject-to amendment. That was the message of Sanford

& Brooks160 and North American
2.

Oil.161

Application of the Tax Benefit Rule

Intuitively the recovery of a deducted item produces income. With
that general conclusion, I have no quarrel. However, under the Rule,
the recovery produces income because of the prior beneficial deduction.
Without the prior benefit, the recovery produces no income - at least
not since the enactment of section 111.162 Again, I cannot quarrel with
these results. However, I disagree with the cause of the income.
Strictly, the recovery does produce income because of the prior
beneficial deduction; however, the complete and correct analysis is
more complex than the tax benefit rule suggests. Section 10161;' and
the basis mechanism offer the alternative analysis. The results are
the same. However, the income exists because the taxpayer clearly
realizes an amount in excess of his basis rather than simply "because

159.
160.
161.
162.
ch. 619,
163.

I.R.C. § 1341.
Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 359; see supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
North Am. Oil, 286 U.S. at 417; see supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
The forerunner of I.R.C. § 111 was originally enacted in 1942, Act of Oct. 21, 1942,
tit. I, § 116, 56 Stat. 812.
I.R.C. § 1016.
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of the prior beneficial deduction." If this analysis is correct, the tax
benefit rule is unnecessary for reasonable mistakes of fact. Consider
the following steps in the argument:
1. In the traditional tax benefit scenario - involving reasonable
mistakes of fact - a taxpayer deducts an item he believes he owes
based on information reasonably available at year-end. He later discovers his right to recover the item. Nevertheless, the original deduction
is proper under the annual accounting system. It is not subject to
correction; however, the subsequent recovery is a separate taxable
event which the taxpayer must also analyze based on information
reasonably available at the time.
2. The right to a recovery is an asset. The asset exists as a result
of the transaction which caused the deduction. It exists even if the
taxpayer is unaware of its existence. If the taxpayer were to die, his
heirs would be seised of the asset.
3. The asset necessarily has a basis. It is a basic tenet of tax law
that all assets have a basis.
4. The basis in the asset is a function of the taxpayer's basis in
the item exchanged or otherwise expended in the transaction giving
rise to the apparent deduction.
5. Because the taxpayer properly deducted his basis or a portion
of his basis in the prior transaction, his basis in the asset is correspondingly less than a simple transfer basis. If the item were fully deducted,
then his asset basis is zero. This point is critical to the analysis. Section
1016 requires an adjustment to basis "for expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to [a] capital account."164
Because the taxpayer's prior deduction was based on all information
then reasonably available, it was a proper deduction and thus was
properly chargeable to a capital account. Such a "charge" can involve
an increase (capitalization) or a decrease in the capital account (expense). When the deduction is "charged" (expensed) to the capital
account the basis is reduced. Thus, the newly acquired asset, albeit
unknown, obtains a reduced transfer basis.
6. When the taxpayer recovers the asset he experiences a taxable
event: the recovery constitutes an "accession to wealth, clearly
realized" under Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.'- Under similar
analysis, the taxpayer's collection of the right to recover can be deemed
a sale or exchange of the right and thus a taxable event. 1 The tax-

164. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1) (emphasis added).
165. 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
166. I.R.C. § 1271. Internal Revenue Code § 1271 provides that collection of a note is a
sale or exchange. Id. Prior to the enactment of the predecessor to § 1271, I.R.C. § 1232 (1954),
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payer has a zero, or at least a reduced basis, in the right to recover
the asset. Thus, the taxpayer's amount realized equals the value of
the asset recovered. His gain equals the amount realized less the zero
or otherwise reduced basis.
7. Section 111167 then operates on the recovery to exclude that
portion of the value for which no beneficial deduction occurred. Thus,
if the asset has appreciated following the original transaction, the
appreciation value should be excluded under section 111. Similarly, if
the asset had a value greater than basis at the time of the transaction,
and if the deduction was limited to the basis, then the extra value
would be excluded from income under section 111. The resulting income thus would equal the prior deduction.
8. The new basis of the recovered asset would equal the amount
of the recognized income, which, as demonstrated above, would equal
the old basis which had been deducted. Thus, the taxpayer would be
in the same position as if he had never taken the deduction.
This analysis does not change the result of the traditional tax
benefit rule. However, it does justify the Rule as something other
than a judicial creation. It does not correct fully the error because it
does not account for changing tax rates, collateral matters, and the
time value of money. The situation, however, does not involve a true
error. Under an annual accounting system, reasonable mistakes based
on reasonably available information are not errors. Thus, the failure
of the basis mechanism to fully correct is not a failure of the
mechanism, but rather a failure of the annual accounting system. Also,
the basis mechanism is consistent with the annual accounting theory
of our tax system: each year stands alone. The current income exists
not because of the prior deduction, but rather because the recovery
results in an accession to wealth clearly realized.
B.

Class B: Unreasonable Mistakes of Fact and Mistakes of Law
1. Background

I classify as "unreasonable mistakes of fact" those mistakes which
a taxpayer should have discovered from information reasonably availFairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939), provided that collection of a note was not a
sale or exchange. Id. at 438. In any event, no one legitimately doubts that collection is a taxable
event. With this in mind, the phrase "recovery of capital" to denote a non-taxable transaction
is a misnomer. For example, a taxpayer who withdraws funds from a bank account "recovers
capital" and incurs no income. The reason, however, is not that the transaction is non-taxable
because it is a "recovery of capital;" rather, the taxpayer inevitably has a basis in the right to
recover equal to the amount withdrawn. Thus the taxable event of withdrawin, the funds
produces no gain or loss.
167. I.R.G. § 111.
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able in the year of the original deduction, omission, inclusion, or
capitalization. Such mistakes are subject to correction by way of an
amended return or a notice of deficiency, subject only to the statute
of limitations and in some instances, section 481.16 I group mistakes
of law with such unreasonable mistakes of fact because legal mistakes
are not binding under the annual accounting system.' 69 They too are
subject to correction by way of an amended return or a notice of
deficiency, subject to the statute of limitations.
Traditionally, the Rule has not applied in this area; instead, the
Tax Court has applied the erroneous deduction exception to the Rule. 170
The Ninth Circuit decision in Unvert,71 however, casts doubt on that
tradition. The tradition, however, is correct - and Unvert incorrect
- for reasons not articulated by the Tax Court's erroneous deduction
exception.
The mitigation provisions, particularly section 1312(7), 172 provide
the congressional solution for correction of errors caused by unreasonable mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. This solution is superior to
the Unvert use of the Rule because the mitigation provisions, as
explained earlier, are a superior - though more cumbersome - error
correction device: they provide for more complete correction.
Understanding this analysis requires what some authorities might
consider a departure from traditional tax thought. It requires agreement with the following: An erroneous deduction or expense of an
item does not result in a basis reduction.
Not only does section 1016 support this statement, but in addition,
section 1312(7) has no application if the statement is incorrect.
Nevertheless, many tax authorities may experience initial difficulty
with the concept.

168. In some instances, the government has argued that erroneous treatment by a taxpayer
amounted to a method of accounting. In such cases, § 481 - dealing with changes of accounting
methods - arguably requires current or prospective rather than retroactive correction. While
I believe that the government's position is questionable, discussion of the issue is beyond the
scope of this article. If the government position is correct, it would slightly limit the application
of the tax benefit rule or of the mitigation provision, but it would not change the substantive
analysis. For a critical discussion of the government's position in this area, see Seago, Horvitz
& Linton, When is the Correction of an Errora Change in Taxpayer's Method of Accounting?,
73 J. TAX. 76 (1990).
169. Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807, 816 (1979) ("It is well-settled that estoppel does
not apply to mistakes of law, but before a mistake of law can occur both parties must know
the facts." (citation omitted)), affd, 656 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961 (1982).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 39-74.
171. 656 F.2d at 483.
172. I.R.C. § 1312(7).
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2.

A Defense of the Erroneous Deduction/Basis Theory

Consider section 1016(a): "GENERAL RULE - Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases be made - (1) for
expenditures, receipts, losses, or other items, properly chargeable to
capital account." 17n First note that a "charge" to an account can either
involve an increase or a decrease. Normally a decreasing charge is
thought of as a "charge off'; however, such a viewpoint is not inconsistent with viewing section 1016(a)(1) as applying to expenses which
both increase as well as decrease the basis of assets. Also, note that
section 1016(a)(2) provides for basis reductions due to "exhaustion,
wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion, to the extent
of the amount - (A) allowed as deductions . . . but not less than the
This provision suggests that an excessive
amount allowable . . ."174
and thus erroneous allowed deduction would reduce basis. Perhaps
so. Nevertheless, section 1016(a)(1), which would apply in nearly all
events other than those involving depreciation and depletion, has no
comparable provision. The section merely requires a basis effect for
"proper" charges. Excessive or improper charges do not affect basis.
3.

Example Five

Taxpayer spends $1000 moving a particular piece of machinery to
a special location. In most cases such an expenditure would be "properly chargeable" to a capital account - namely the machinery. Thus,
taxpayer increases his basis in the machinery.
If taxpayer discovers in a later year either that he never paid the
$1000 or that the $1000 expenditure was not attributable to that particular machinery and that he should have known this information in
the prior period, then the increase in basis was erroneous. Section
1016(a)(1) then provides that no adjustment to basis would have occurred because the payment was not "properly chargeable to a capital
account."175

This analysis does only a little violence to the annual accounting
theory. Although the determination of basis requires an examination
of a transaction in a prior period, such a look-back is essential to any
determination of basis. Also, the determination would not itself require
a prior period correction of any errors which resulted from a prior
erroneous determination of basis. As explained below, section 1312(7)
supports this analysis.176
173.

I.R.C. § 1016(a).

174. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2).
175. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1).
176. See infra text accompanying notes 177-97.
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Example Six

Taxpayer consumes supplies not previously expensed in his business. Such consumption properly reduces or "is charged to" the capital
account containing the supplies. It also results in a deduction.
If taxpayer discovers in a later year that he never consumed the
supplies and that he could and should have known the truth during
the taxable year of the expenses, then the deduction was erroneous.
Again, section 1016(a)(1) provides that no downward adjustment to
basis ever occurred because the original deduction was not "properly
chargeable to [a] capital account." Also, once again the determination
is prospective: it does not affect prior periods. Section 1312(7) concerns
prior errors.
5.

Example Seven

Taxpayer pays what he believes to be an interest payment for his
business. He creates no capital account because the payment creates
no asset. He later receives a refund of the payment.
Legally, taxpayer's "payment" amounted to a mere deposit which
he has a right to recover. Thus, he unknowingly created an asset.
Under section 1012,177 the asset has a cost basis equal to the amount
deposited. The erroneous deduction of the deposit does not affect this
capital account because section 1016(a) - the basis adjustment section
- applies only to proper deductions rather than to erroneous ones.
6.

Application to Unvert Facts

Example Seven uses the Unvert 178 facts. Mr. Unvert paid an
amount erroneously believing it to be interest. In fact, Mr. Unvert
had a right to recover the amount and later recovered it. The Tax
Court held that Unvert had income under an estoppel theory. It
explained that the tax benefit rule does not apply to the recovery of
erroneous deductions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, but rejected the estoppel theory, holding that Unvert had
income under the tax benefit rule: he recovered an item previously
17
beneficially deducted. 9
Analyzed properly Unvert did not have income. He collected an
amount to which he was entitled. Collection of a note is a taxable

177.
178.
179.

I.R.C. § 1012.
656 F.2d at 483.
Id. at 486.
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event. 18° Usually the event produces no taxable income because the
taxpayer has a basis equal to the amount collected. Similarly, Unvert
should have recognized no income because he properly should have
created a capital account equal to the amount he thought he was
paying in interest. Thus, when he recovered that same amount, he
would have had no accession to wealth and no realization in excess of
basis. The Tax Court need not have spoken in terms of the tax benefit
rule or any supposed erroneous deduction exception thereto.
Because the statute of limitations for the year of deduction by
Unvert was closed at the time of discovery, neither the government
nor Unvert could properly correct the erroneous deduction of "interest" payments. However, the non-recognition of income on the recovery could give rise to a section 1312(7)181 circumstance of adjustment
such that sections 1311', 2 and 1314'8 would permit correction of the

earlier deduction. In such an event the correction would be full rather
than the partial type created by the tax benefit rule.
7. Application of Mitigation
Determining whether the mitigation provisions apply requires the
application of seven general factors of mitigation. In addition, the
fourth factor -

the circumstance of adjustment - has in this instance

four additional specific subfactors.
The first requirement provides that an error must have occurred
with regard to the year in question.18 Unvert incorrectly deducted
payments during the early year, which he should have known were
not properly deductible.," Therefore, Unvert made an erroneous deduction and the first factor is met.
The second requirement of mitigation provides that correction of
the error must be barred.

s6

Unvert erroneously deducted the pay-

180. I.R.C. § 1271(a)(1). Section 1271(a)(1) provides that "[almounts received by the holder
on retirement of any debt instrument shall be considered as amounts received in exchange
therefore." Id.
181. I.R.C. § 1312(7).
182. I.R.C. § 1311.
183. I.R.C. § 1314.
184. I.R.C. § 1311(a). Section 1311(a) refers to the error requirement. Id. Section 1312
lists the seven circumstances of adjustment and notes that each circumstance depends not upon
mere inconsistencies, but rather upon erroneous treatment in the instant year. I.R.C. § 1312.
185. Unvert, 656 F.2d at 484.
186. I.R.O. § 1311(a). Section 1311(a) provides that the bar to correction of the error must
result from "the operation of any law or rule of law." Id. Treasury regulations explain that
"rule of law" includes the doctrine of res judicata. Treas. Reg. § 1.1311(a)-2(a) (1990). In some
instances, not involving the Unvert facts, the time when correction is barred is -1so crucial.
I.R.C. § 1311(b)(2).
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ments during 1969, a year for which the statute of limitations on
assessments ran on April 15, 1973. The IRS completed an audit of his
1970 and 1971 returns in August of 1973, but apparently never audited
his 1969 return.1 s7 Therefore, the statute of limitations barred correction of the erroneous deduction.
The third requirement of mitigation provides that a determination
must exist and must require treatment that is inconsistent with the
treatment in question. - This requirement would have been met if the
Unvert litigation had resulted in his not being taxed on the refund,
and thus had not applied the tax benefit rule. The court decision
would, in this instance, fulfill the "determination" requirement. Not
taxing Unvert on the recovery - because he retained an unreduced
cost basis - would have been inconsistent with his having deducted
the payments. Thus, when the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court,
the third requirement of mitigation was met.
The fourth mitigation requirement demands that one of seven possible circumstances of adjustment set out in section 1312 must exist. 189
Section 1312(7) provides the appropriate circumstance for the Unvert
facts. Section 1312(7) has four subfactors.
First, the determination must establish the basis of property.Unvert acquired a basis in the right to the refund even though he
was unaware of the right. Section 1012191 provides a cost basis for
assets. The Unvert court could have determined that Unvert had a
basis in the refund equal to the amount of the refund. Thus, the court

187. Unvert, 656 F.2d at 484.
188. I.R.C. §§ 1311(a), 1313(a). The determination may take the form of a judgment, a
closing agreement, a disposition of a refund claim, or a special agreement with regard to
mitigation. Id. § 1313(a). Significantly, it need not note the error nor even discuss the inconsistent
treatment. It must merely do something that is in fact inconsistent - in one of the seven
circumstances listed in § 1312 -- with the erroneous treatment.
189. I.R.C. § 1312. The covered circumstances are:
(1) the double inclusion of an item in gross income;
(2) the double allowance of a deduction or credit;
(3) the double exclusion of an item from gross income;
(4) the double disallowance of a deduction or credit;
(5) the inconsistent treatment of certain deductions or inclusions between a trust or estate
and a legatee, beneficiary, or heir;
(6) the inconsistent treatment of certain deductions or credits between certain related corporations;
(7) the determination of the basis of property that is dependent upon, or that is treated as
having been affected by, a transaction in which one of several listed errors occurred with respect
to one of several described parties. Id.
190. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A).
191. I.R.C. § 1012.
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decision could have established the basis of property and the requirement would have been met.
Second, the particular error must fit the description of one of three
types of errors listed in the statute. 19 Section 1312(7)(C)(iii) provides,
"there was an erroneous deduction of an item properly chargeable to
capital account or an erroneous charge to capital account of an item
properly deductible."' 1 Unvert erroneously deducted as interest a payment which legally amounted to a deposit. The item was properly
chargeable to a capital account denominated as a deposit. This account
represents the right which the court should have determined had a
cost basis equal to the amount transferred. Thus, the requisite error
occurred.
Third, the particular error must occur with respect to one of three
particular types of taxpayers. Section 1312(7)(B)(i) applies to "the
taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is made."1 Unvert
would have served the role both as the determination taxpayer and
as the taxpayer who erroneously deducted the payments. Thus, he
would satisfy the requirement.
Fourth, the particular error must be in "respect of" any transaction
195 If
on which the basis established by the determination depends.
properly decided, the determination (the court decision) would have
established the asset basis (the right of return) as a cost basis. Thus,
the basis would have depended on the transaction in which Unvert
transferred money. In addition, the original erroneous deduction of
the payments would have been "in respect of' that transaction. Thus,
the requirement would have been met.
The fifth mitigation requirement appears in section 1311(b)(3), 196
which insists that the proper relationship must exist at the proper
192. Section 1312(7)(C) provides:
With respect to a taxpayer described in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph - (i)
there was an erroneous inclusion in, or omission from, gross income, (ii) there was
an erroneous recognition, or nonrecognition, of gain or loss, or (iii) there was an
erroneous deduction of an item properly chargeable to capital account or an erroneous charge to capital account of an item properly deductible.

Id.
193. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(C)(iii).
194. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(B)(i).
195. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A). The "in respect of' requirement is sometimes confusing, though
not in relation to the Unvert facts. For a discussion of this confusing requirement, see Willis,
Some Limits of EquitableRecoupment, Tax Mitigation,and Res Judicata:Reflections Prompted
by Chertkof v. United States, 38 TAX LAW. 625, 657-59 (1985).
196. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(3). In most instances the determination party and the error party
are one and the same and, thus, obviously meet the relationship requirements. For circumstances
involving two persons, the Code defines permissible relationships and the times during which
those relationships must exist. I.R.C. § 1313(c).
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time between the party who obtained the determination and the party
with respect to whom the error occurred. This factor overlaps with
the third requirement of the section 1312(7) circumstance of adjustment
the particular error must occur with respect to a particular taxpayer. Because Unvert would have characterized both the error taxpayer and the determination taxpayer, the requirement would have
been met.
The sixth requirement demands that the determination must adopt
a position maintained by a particular party.' 97 Under section 1311(b),
because the adjustment would result in a deficiency, the determination
must adopt the position maintained by the taxpayer, Unvert. Unvert
argued to the court that he had no income because he was merely
recovering capital. That was another way of maintaining that he had
a basis in the right to the refund equal to its cost. Thus, had the
court agreed with him, and thereby not applied the tax benefit rule,
it would have adopted the position of the taxpayer and the sixth
requirement would have been met.
Finally, the seventh requirement for mitigation provides that the
position adopted must be inconsistent with the prior erroneous treatment.' 98 Just as the determination must result in a circumstance that
is inconsistent with other treatment, the adopted position also must
be inconsistent with the error. Unvert's argument that he merely
recovered capital was inconsistent with his prior deduction. Therefore,
the seventh requirement would have been met.
Thus, had the court adopted Unvert's position, the mitigation provisions would have applied. Unvert would not have had 1972 income
under the tax benefit rule; however, under section 1314 the government would have had one year from the date of the determination to
seek a deficiency for 1969.' 99 Such a correction would have been more
complete than the partial correction which actually resulted from the
Unvert decision. Mitigation would have restored the erroneous deduction in 1969, with all of its various collateral effects. In addition,
Unvert would have owed interest since the due date for the 1969
return.

197. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(1). If the adjustment mandated by mitigation is credited or refunded,
the adopted position will have to be that of the Secretary. If, however, the adjustment is
assessed or collected, the position will have to be that of the determination taxpayer.
198. I.R.C. § 1311(b). The position adopted need not be inconsistent with another position
that supported the error; rather the position need be inconsistent only with the fact of the
error, regardless of whether the taxpayer or his related party argued anything in the error
year. Thus, two positions need not exist. Significantly, the determination need not note the
inconsistency.
199. I.R.C. § 1314.
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8. The Difficulty With Applying Mitigation
A catch to the scenario exists. For mitigation to reach fruition, a
determination must occur - the third requirement. Without the determination, the mitigation provisions would not apply and therefore,
correction of the error would not be available. Section 1313(a) provides
that a determination may be: (1) a final court decision; (2) a closing
agreement; (3) a final disposition for a refund claim; or (4) a signed
agreement between the taxpayer and the Secretary pursuant to particular regulations.2 0 Had the government properly understood that
mitigation was the correct solution for Unvert's errors, it would never
have sought to apply the tax benefit rule.201 Thus no litigation, refund
claim, or agreement would have resulted. Without one, no determination would have occurred and therefore mitigation could never have
applied.
Had the government realized during litigation that it would be
better off losing the case and then seeking mitigation, two possibilities
might have occurred. One, the government could have conceded the
tax benefit issue, in which case the court would not have adopted the
position of the taxpayer but rather would have adopted the position
of the government. Thus, the sixth requirement of mitigation - the
adoption of the position offered by a particular party - would have
failed. Therefore correction by way of mitigation would not have been
possible.
Alternatively, the government could have argued the case hoping
to lose it. This would have been misleading to the court and thus
unethical.= Without the misleading and losing argument, again the
sixth requirement - adoption of a position offered by a particular
party - would have failed and mitigation would not have applied.
The mitigation provisions, therefore, do not apply often. They are
complex and subject to many exceptions. Congress intended this result. Congress also intended that mitigation provide the sole exception
to the harshness of the statute of limitations in cases to which the
statute of limitations generally applies.203 Application of the tax benefit
rule to cases in which mitigation is not appropriate - either because
the case lacks a proper determination or because the case lacks the
adoption of the correct position - would do great violence to the

200.
201.
the law,
202.
203.

I.R.C. § 1313(a).
Perhaps "would never" is too strong. But, had the government properly understood
it could not ethically have sought tax benefit correction, which would have been wrong.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1, .3(a)(3) (1983).
See supra note 154.
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mitigation statutes. Such application of the Rule would amount to a
judicial overruling of the clear, specific legislative requirements for
avoiding the statute of limitations protection.
9.

Other Examples of Missed Mitigation

Unvert is not the only case in which the government argued the
wrong correction device and, as a result, hurt itself. Some of the
"erroneous deduction exception" cases would follow the pattern of
Unvert. For example, the Tax Court in Canelo0"- effectively determined that Canelo had an unadjusted basis in his right to reimbursements. As a result and pursuant to section 1314, the government had
one year in which to seek mitigation of the year in which Canelo
erroneously deducted the client advancements. The government failed
to do so.
Another famous example of missed mitigation is the case of
PhiladelphiaPark Amusement Co. v. United States.20 5 The taxpayer
in that decision received a franchise to operate a railway. It then built
a bridge to be used by the streetcars. In 1934, the company exchanged
the bridge for an extension of the franchise. Apparently, the company
did not report the taxable gain resulting from the exchange. Twelve
years later - long after the year of the unreported gain closed the company deducted a loss from the abandonment of the extended
franchise.
The central issue before the court was the determination of the
company's basis in the extended franchise. The court properly
explained that the company had a cost basis in the bridge. Interestingly, the court defined "cost basis" with the following language: "To
maintain harmony with the fundamental purpose of these sections, it
is necessary to consider the fair market value of the property received
as the cost basis to the taxpayer. ' 206 Because the court could not value
the property received - the extension - it directed the trier of fact
to consider the value of the property exchanged, the bridge. From
this language came the popular importance of the decision: that if one
side of a taxable exchange cannot be valued, while the other side can
be valued, the taxpayer should presume the two to be equal.
The remarkable part of the decision, however, is the above quoted
language which effectively maintains that cost equals what is received
rather than what is given up. Why would the court have made such

204.
205.
206.

See supra note 46.
126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. C1. 1954).
Id. at 188.
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an apparently preposterous statement? It did so to maintain the integrity of the taxable year.
Consider another popular, but mistaken, view: new basis in a taxable exchange equals the basis given up plus the gain recognized.
Mathematically, that appears consistent with the court's view that
new basis equals the value received. This appears true because the
gain recognized (C) should be the difference between the value received (A) and the basis given up (B). Recall: if A - B = C, then B
+C=A.
However, what is true for grade-school algebra does not hold true
for tax law. The court properly suggests that B + C does not necessarily equal A. Why? Because the gain (C) may not have been reported
(recognized), as apparently it was not by Philadelphia Park. Because
the basis is a function of what was "proper" rather than what happened, an erroneous non-recognition cannot bind a future determination of basis.
That realization, however, fits neatly with the circumstance of
adjustment found in subsection 1312(7). The Claims Court's determination of Philadelphia Park's basis adopted a position of the taxpayer
which was inconsistent with the non-recognition of gain in the reporting of the transaction - the acquisition - on which such basis depended. Thus, the government could have sought mitigation of the
statute of limitations barring correction of 1934, the year of non-recognition.
Realization that many "erroneous deduction" cases, as well as
PhiladelphiaPark - one of the most famous tax decisions - involved
missed mitigation by the government prompts a legendary story among
tax procedure professors. It goes something like this: "Practitioner
Noitall criticizes Professor Patient for spending an exorbitant amount
of class time covering the mitigation provisions. Noitall claims, 'I have
been practicing tax for forty years and I have never seen a mitigation
case!' Patient responds, 'I don't doubt it. That is why we teach it.' "
Precisely. We teach mitigation so that our graduates will see the
issues when they arise. Unvert, PhiladelphiaPark, and the "erroneous
deduction" cases demonstrate that Noitall has many brethren.
10.

Summary

The mitigation provisions generally are applicable to tax benefit
scenarios which involve erroneous deductions, exclusions, or additions
to basis. Section 1312(7) lists such mistakes as circumstances of adjustment. However, the myriad exceptions and complexities of the mitigation provisions often will preclude ultimate correction. Nevertheless,
because the mitigation provisions provide a correction device applicable
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to the Unvert scenario, the court should not apply the tax benefit
rule. Otherwise, when the court applies the Rule, section 1312(7) can
never apply because the proper determination requirement of section
1312(7) can never occur. Thus, application of the Rule to unreasonable
mistakes of fact and mistakes of law precludes the use of an important
code provision. Such a result is inconsistent with the general proposition that courts construe statutes such that they have application.
Consequently the inclusionary arm of the tax benefit rule must not
apply to unreasonable mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. Thus: 1)
Unvert was incorrectly decided and 2) the historical erroneous deduction exception to the tax benefit rule is correct.
C.

Class C: ProperDeductions
1. Background

I classify this area as "Proper Deductions" to denote those cases
in which the deduction is correct both under the facts reasonably
available at the time and also under all subsequent information. Traditionally, the tax benefit rule did not apply to the recovery of an
amount previously deducted properly. Instead, such a recovery would
have been an unrelated event, which would have been includable or
excludable based on the application of section 61207 and the various
exclusion sections.
The Supreme Court in Bliss Dairy2° expanded the Rule to apply
to actions or transactions inconsistent with prior proper deductions.
Recall that prior tax benefit cases had applied the Rule to two general
circumstances: (1) those in which the taxpayer erroneously deducted
an item, and (2) those in which the taxpayer "reasonably" deducted
an item and thus unknowingly created a zero basis in his right to the
return of that item. As explained above, the Internal Revenue Code
provides adequate remedies to cover recoveries or inconsistencies in
both circumstances without the tax benefit rule. The Bliss Dairy Court
expanded the Rule to apply to a third circumstance in which the
taxpayer properly deducts an item for which the code contains no
special provision for treating recoveries or inconsistent actions.

207. I.R.C. § 61. Section 61 includes "all income from whatever source derived." Id.
208. Bliss Dairy, 460 U.S. at 370. Bliss Dairy was the companion case to Hillsboro, 460
U.S. at 370. I refer to the Bliss Dairy case because that portion of the Court's opinion involved
the more substantial changes in the tax benefit rule.
209. Id. at 397.
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2. The Cause of the Problem
Without the tax benefit rule, and the Bliss Dairy expansions of
it, such recoveries or inconsistencies would be judged by the standards
of section 61 and the various exclusion sections. However, by definition, a proper deduction is just that - proper. The Code contains no
general provision to correct items which are not incorrect. Understandably, however, the Court felt that some provision is necessary to
from a deduction when ultimately
prevent taxpayers from benefiting
210
the deduction is not justified.
Why does this problem exist? The root lies in the use of the tax
system to achieve social and economic policy. 2" If all deductions and
exclusions rested on economic realities, no general correction provision
would be necessary. True errors - if not barred by the statute of
limitations - would be correctable through amended returns, notices
of deficiency, and mitigation. Unjustified but proper deductions would
not occur and thus would never require correction. 2 2 Instead, we have
a tax system containing many policy-oriented provisions. Frequently,
the consequences of such provisions transcend a year-end. Consequently, a taxpayer may benefit from a proper deduction which later
proves to have been unjustified, although still proper.
The distinction between "unjustified" and "erroneous" is important.
A deduction motivated by economic reality is inherently "justified" economically the taxpayer suffers a loss or a cost and thus has less
economic income. In contrast, a deduction motivated by social or
economic policy is "justified" only if the particular social or economic
policy is somehow furthered by the taxpayer action, inaction, or transaction.

210. Id. at 383. The Court explained that not all inconsistencies would be "fundamental."
Id. Although the Court did not use the term "unjustified," its explanation of the difference
between "unexpected events and inconsistent events" implies such a meaning. Id. at n.15.
211. For a more complete discussion of the perils resulting from the use of the tax system
to achieve policy - as opposed to revenue raising - goals, see Willis, Masks, Magic and
Games: The use of Tax Law As a Policy Tool, 4 Am.J. TAx POL'Y 41 (1985); Hoeflich, Of
Reason, Gamesmanship, and Taxes: A Jurisprudentialand Games Theoretical Approach to
the Problem of Voluntary Compliance, 2 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 9 (1983).
212. If the tax system allowed deductions only if they represented actual economic costs,
then all deductions would be justified at the time taken. This would be true both of cash and
accrual method taxpayers: cash taxpayers would take deductions when they were paid, and
accrual taxpayers would take deductions when incurred. Neither would take a deduction based
on a mere promise of future economic costs. Thus unjustified deductions would not occur.
Naturally, inconsistencies resulting from recoveries of amounts deducted and discharge of indebtedness would remain possible; however, correction devices other than the tax benefit rule
could adequately deal with such matters.
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Initially, a policy deduction is allowed based on the taxpayer's
promise - implicit or explicit - that he will do, or has done, something
which Congress felt would help achieve the particular social or
economic policy. Whenever the promise and its fulfillment transcend
a year end, problems can occur. The taxpayer may have fully intended
to complete his action or transaction or to continue in his inaction,
but nevertheless he may fail in a later year. Nevertheless, he would
have received the tax benefit in the prior year of the promise. Unless
the Code contains an appropriate correction device, the taxpayer may
thus receive the benefit without ever fulfilling the promise.
3.

Further Examples
(a) Example Eight

For example, accelerated depreciation exists partially to encourage
investment.21; The benefits of the provisions accumulate over the early
years of an asset's life. Then, in the later years, the taxpayer suffers
correspondingly reduced depreciation. Such a system is justifiable because the taxpayer receives a benefit in exchange for the promise to
invest in particular property for business purposes. A correction device
is necessary in this area because the accelerated depreciation exceeds
economic reality. Without such a device, a taxpayer could benefit from
his promised investment even though he failed to continue the investment. If, instead, depreciation were limited to economic losses, no
particular correction device would be required because the taxpayer
necessarily would suffer the loss before he received the tax benefit.
In other words, the benefit would not provide a reward for a mere
promise.
The Code contains partial correction devices to account for taxpayers who "promise" to invest in particular business property but
later break the promise. Generally, the basis mechanism reduces the
taxpayer windfall because the taxpayer loses basis as he takes depreciation..214 In addition, Congress added the recapture provisions of sections 1245215 and 1250216 to prevent further windfall. Significantly, such
recapture did not exist in the early years of accelerated depreciation. 27

213. I.R.C. § 168; see, e.g., S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. 12, at 13, reprinted in
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 105: "[A] restructuring of depreciation allowances for tax
purposes would be an effective way of stimulating capital formulation."
214. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2).
215. I.R.C. § 1245.
216. I.R.C. § 1250.
217. Accelerated depreciation first appeared in the Code in 1954 with the enactment of §
167(b), which approved the double declining balance and sum of the years' digits methods. 1 B.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss4/1

46

Willis: The Tax Benefit Rule: A Different View and a Unified Theory of Er
TAX BENEFIT RULE: ERROR CORRECTION

However, when Congress saw the potential unjustified benefit to taxpayers who disposed of depreciated assets, it enacted the recapture
provisions. These provisions do not fully correct for the "unjustified"
benefit; instead, they partially correct only by affecting the character
of gain on disposition.
(b) Example Nine
Example nine involves the investment tax credit provisions. 218
Enacted to reward taxpayers who invest as Congress desires, they,
too, contain a recapture correction device. 219 Taxpayers who dispose

of the credit property early are forced to recapture a portion of the
prior credit. As with accelerated depreciation recapture, this correction device is necessary because the taxpayer benefit is created in
exchange for a mere promise: the taxpayer receives a benefit when
he promises to invest for a particular term. If the investment later
proves to be shorter than promised, the Code takes part of the benefit
back.
(c) Example Ten
Example ten involves the Crane v. Commissioner ° and Commissioner v. Tufts22' scenarios. The courts, through Crane and its
progeny, gave taxpayers a benefit - the inclusion of non-recourse
debt in basis - in exchange for promised investment. Such a basis
inclusion is not justified by economic reality because such a taxpayer
has not yet actually invested in the asset to the extent of the non-recourse debt.2 Rather than reverse Crane, the Tufts Court recaptured
the benefit upon disposition of the investment: the debt, which really
was not an investment, and thus not properly included in basis, becomes an amount realized on disposition even though in reality it is
not always an accession to wealth.-

BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs 23-52 (1981). Sections 1245

and 1250, providing for recapture of depreciation, first appeared in 1962, as part of Pub. L.
No. 87-834, § 13(a), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1216. In 1964, as part
of Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231(a), reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 117, respectively.
218. I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-49.
219. I.R.C. § 47.
220. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
221. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
222.

See supra note 117.

223. See Bittker, supra note 118, at 278.
224. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 313. The Court explained that the "economic benefit theory" did
not justify the Tufts decision. Id.
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Example Eleven

Example eleven involves section 179.- Congress therein awarded
taxpayers with an expense deduction for certain capital items in exchange for promised investment. Originally, regulations provided
merely that taxpayers who did not continue their promise of investment for two years had to recapture a portion of the benefit.- 6 In
1986 Congress expanded the recapture provision to apply to any case
in which the section 179 property ceased to be applicable property "at
any time.' ' - 7 Once again, the correction device was necessary because
the initial benefit rested on a taxpayer promise rather than upon
economic reality. Thus, correction was mandated whenever the promise became unfulfillable.
4.

Application to Bliss Dairy

Were it not for policy-oriented deductions the Rule would be unnecessary: in relation to non-policy-oriented deductions, general internal revenue code provisions provide adequate correction devices consistent with annual accounting. Policy-oriented deductions, however,
are common. They are the product of both congressional and judicial
policy. Arguably every such case requires a correction device because
inherently a policy-oriented deduction rests on a taxpayer promise.
Instances which do not transcend a year-end are easily resolvable:
denial of the deduction if the promise is unfulfilled. Other instances,
however, demand correction.
No such general correction device exists in the Code. As shown
above, specific devices exist in many areas - depreciation, investment
tax credit, and section 179 recapture. The Bliss Dairy- opinion is
quite broad. It not only traces the history of the inclusionary arm of
the tax benefit rule, but it also attempts to formulate a general summary of the tax benefit rule. Nevertheless, the core meaning of the
case rests on the fact it applies to a proper deductions factual scenario.
The Bliss Dairy attempt to provide a general rule of correction, however, is subject to criticism on six counts.
First, the Bliss Dairy holding is not limited to policy-oriented
deductions and credits. Instead it applies generally, even to areas in

225. I.R.C. § 179.
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.179-1(e)(1) (1990).
227. I.R.C. § 179(d)(10) (emphasis added).
228. Bliss Dairy, 460 U.S. at 370. Bliss Dairy was the companion case to Hillsboro, 460
U.S. at 370.
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which the basis mechanism or mitigation provisions provide the same
or a better solution.
Second, the Court corrects a problem that Congress chose not to
address. Congress allowed deductions for ordinary and necessary business expenses.2 9 It did not provide for recapture of those deductions
by corporations liquidating under former section 337.- ° For the Court
to correct such a "proper" deduction subjects the Court to the charge
of legislating. The precedence of a Tufts231 judicial correction device
does not rebut the "legislating" charge: Tufts was a correction of a
judicially created error.
Significantly, depreciation, investment tax credit (I.T.C.), and section 179 recapture provisions each took congressional action. Each is
subject to limitations: I.T.C. and section 179 recapture historically
applied only for a short period, and depreciation recapture applies
only to a disposition. Arguably Congress chose not to apply correction
in instances not specifically covered by the few existing correction
provisions. Therefore, the Court opens itself to the charge of legislating when it corrects an error Congress chose to leave untouched.
Recognition of Congress's special concern for the statute of limitations
supports the view that Congress wanted to leave untouched those
errors it failed specifically to correct.
In partial defense of the Court's holding, the Bliss Dairy anomaly
resulted partly from a judicially created error, not just from congressional inaction. Bliss Dairy - a cash method taxpayer - deducted
the cattle feed before the cows ate it. This was proper because of the
judicially created Zaninovich23 2 rule. Generally, expenses are currently
deductible if they do not create a life substantially beyond the end of
the tax year. 23 Zaninovich v. Commissioner defined "substantially"
as one year.234 Thus, cattle feed purchased by a cash method taxpayer
is deductible if the taxpayer expects it to be eaten within one year
after the end of the taxable year of purchase. The Zaninovich rule is
a policy-oriented deduction based on administrative convenience rather

229.
230.

I.R.C. § 162.
I.R.C. § 337 (1985).

231. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 300. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor, who authored the Hillsboro
and Bliss Dairy opinions, concurred in Tufts, explaining her reticence at applying such a broad
rule. She concurred because too many cases before had approved Crane and thus the Court
was not writing on a clean slate. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 317-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232. Zaninovich v. Commissioner, 616 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1980).
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1) (1990).
234. 616 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1980).
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than economic reality. Thus, as with other policy deductions, it creates
the need for a correction device. Because the need is judicially created,
perhaps it is appropriate for the solution to be judicially created as
well..Third, the Bliss Dairy facts were a poor vehicle for the formulation
of such important policy. Bliss Dairy adopted its plan of liquidation
two days after the end of the taxable year in which the cattle feed
was purchased.'! Under the annual accounting system, the feed was
deductible based on the information reasonably existing at the end of
the year of purchase. What happened two days later would not be
relevant, except to the extent that it is evidence of what the taxpayer
could and should reasonably have known. Rather than broad statements concerning the tax benefit rule, the Court could have limited
Zaninovich. Perhaps Bliss Dairy did not know on June 30 that it
would adopt a plan of liquidation on July 2; however, I doubt it. If
so, then either Zaninovich did not apply to permit the deduction or
Zaninovich should have been limited.
Fourth, the Court in initially describing the Bliss Dairy problem
confuses the tax benefit rule with the basis mechanism. This casts
doubt on the Court's understanding of the area. The opinion states:
The problem in Bliss Dairy is more complicated. Bliss took
a deduction under section 162, so we must begin by examining that provision . . . The deduction is predicated on the
consumption of the asset in the trade or business . . . . If
the taxpayer later sells the asset rather than consuming it
in furtherance of his trade or business, it is quite clear that
he would lose his deduction, for the basis of the asset would
be zero . . . so he would recognize the full amount qf the
37
proceeds on sale as gain. _
Strictly, the deduction was under the Zaninovich interpretation
of sections 461 and 162. The Court should have so noted, because
Zaninovich is the root of this problem. More importantly, the Court
notes that as a result of a sale following a section 162 expense, the
taxpayer would lose his deduction.- Nonsense. The deduction would

235. The Court in Hillsboro cites Zaninovich favorably. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 384. The
dissent questions the validity of the deduction, noting that the Commissioner also questions
whether the Bliss Dairy deduction was proper, and that the courts are split on the issue. Id.
at 420 n.31 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. Id. at 374.
237. Id. at 395 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
238. Id.
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stand as a proper deduction if based on reasonable information, assuming the correctness of Zaninovich. The Court is correct in the next
clause, "for the basis of the asset would be zero . . . so he would

recognize the full amount of the proceeds on sale as gain."' 9 This is
true, again assuming a proper deduction. However, the use of the
word "for" is puzzling. The clause about gain on sale because of a
reduced basis is correct, but it is not support for nor does it cause
the taxpayer to "lose his deduction." Instead, the 1016 basis mechanism
would apply, as discussed earlier.- °
Perhaps Bliss Dairy should have lost the deduction. If it indeed
misapplied Zaninovich, then that would be the proper result. No gain
would result, however. Or, perhaps we need a better-crafted tax benefit rule which causes the loss of an unjustified deduction. Such a rule
would require a re-determination of a prior year's taxes. It would not
involve gain. In this context the two concepts - loss of a deduction
and recognition of gain - are mutually exclusive. They are neither
synonymous nor supportive of each other.
Apparently the Court did not fully comprehend the distinction between the loss of a deduction and the measurement of gain as a function
of basis, which in turn was a function of the prior deduction. Not only
are they antithetical, but they also achieve very different results. Loss
of a deduction results in full correction. Recognition of gain in this
context results in partial correction. The distinction of the concepts
as well as their effects is at the heart of the tax benefit problem. The
Court's confusion of the two destroys much of the opinion's credibility.
Fifth, the decision is not limited to judicially created policy deductions. On its face, the opinion would apply as well to cases in which
Congress adopted a policy-motivated deduction accompanied by a partial correction device. For example, a taxpayer who benefited from
accelerated depreciation and who ceased to use the asset for business
purposes, but did not dispose of it, would not be subject to recapture
under the statute. 1 However, under the Court's holding in Bliss
Dairy, recapture could result in this situation.22 Nevertheless, for the

239. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66.
241. Sections 1245 and 1250, which deal with depreciation recapture, are triggered by a
"disposition." I.R.C. § 1245(a); id. § 1250(a). A mere change in use generally would not be a
sufficient trigger. Compare, however, § 1245(b)(7)(B), under which a mere change in use would
be a trigger. I.R.C. § 1245(b)(7)(B).
242. Although the Court does not address whether a "change in use" would be a "fundamentally inconsistent event," I see no reasons why it would not be.
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Court to expand the narrowly drawn recapture statute in this instance
would not seem appropriate. Similarly, prior to 1976, if a taxpayer
ceased to use section :[79 property more than two years after taking
a section 179 deduction, no recapture was necessary. 43 Congress deleted the time limit in 1986.2 4 Arguably, however, Bliss Dairy would
have repealed the time limit, even without congressional action.
Sixth, the correction method chosen is a poor method. The mitigation provisions-5 and section 1341.6 provide superior models for a
correction device than does the historical inclusionary tax benefit rule.
Thus, if the Court so felt the need to legislate, it should have acted
as a better legislature and thus formulated a more complete correction
device.
V.

PROPOSALS

The tax benefit rule should be restricted to judicially created policy
deductions. Other applications are either unnecessary or should be
left to Congress. When applicable, the Rule should apply much like
equitable recoupment: two wrongs make a right. To the extent tax
was saved in a prior period, the current tax should be increased. This
would be an equitable increase in tax rather than in income. Congress
should provide a correction device for all policy-motivated deductions
or credits. Ideally, such provisions would operate like a reverse section
1341: to the extent the taxpayer saved tax, he would correct by paying
more. Or, Congress could create an eighth circumstance of adjustment
under section 1312, and thus actually re-open the prior "error" year.
VI.

APPLICATION TO OTHER SITUATIONS AND CASES

Many authors have analyzed the tax benefit rule and its seemingly
inconsistent application in various cases. The following is a critical
analysis of other writings on the subject.
A.

Burke, Friel and the Rojas Case

Professors Burke and Friel wrote an interesting 1989 article2 7

243. I.R.C. § 179(d)(10) (1985).
244. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 202(c) reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 514.
245. I.R.C. § 1311-14. For a discussion of these provisions, see supra text accompanying
notes 182-201.
246. I.R.C. § 1341. For a discussion of this provision, see supra text accompanying notes
124-43.
247. Burke & Friel, Uncowed by Bliss Dairy: Rojas v. Commissioner and the Scope of the
Tax Benefit Rule, 13 REV. TAX'N IND. 86 (1989).
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criticizing the Tax Court's application of the Rule in Rojas v. Commissioner,?As a 1988 decision, later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 9
Like Bliss Dairy, Rojas involved agricultural deductions preceding
a tax-favored section 837 liquidation. In contrast to the unconsumedbut-nevertheless-expensed Bliss Dairycattle feed, Rojas involved consumed-and-expensed fertflizer.5 The Tax Court distinguished Bliss
Dairy on the issue of consumption. In the eyes of the Tax Court,
expensed-and-consumed items are not subject to the Rule even if the
investments connected to the expense - here the crops - are distributed in a tax-free liquidation. 1 Professors Burke and Friel partially
criticize the decision as mere form over substance.2 2 I disagree.
The Bliss Dairyexpense was proper (Class C) but artificial because
it resulted from the policy rule of Zaninovich.m It demanded a correction device because the taxpayer did not fulfill its promise of business
use or consumption. In contrast, the Rojas expenses were partially
unreasonable mistakes (Class B) and partially proper (Class C). To
the extent the taxpayer knew at the time of the expense that it would
liquidate and thus not realize the income, the expense should have
been capitalized because it would not have been incurred in the ordinary course of a trade or business. To that extent, deduction was an
unreasonable mistake. Thus, it would be correctable by an amended
return or a notice of deficiency.
On the other hand, because the Commissioner stipulated that all
the expenses were incurred in the ordinary course of a trade or business (which includes the notion of continuity), all the expenses were
proper. The fact that no income attributable to those expenses may
ever have been actually generated by the taxpayer is immaterial and
is a natural consequence of annual accounting, Sanford & Brooks,2
and North American Oil. Professors Burke and Friel suggest, however, that perhaps the expenses were not justified.?6
Their argument rests on citation to Commissioner v. Idaho Power
Co., 2- which required that depreciation expense attributable to vehi-

248.
249.
250.
251.

90 T.C. 1090 (1988).
Rojas v. Commissioner, 901 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1109.

252.

Burke & Friel, supra note 247, at 94-95.

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Zaninovich v. Commissioner, 616 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1980).
Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 359.
North Am. Oil, 286 U.S. at 417.
Burke & Friel, supra note 247, at 95.
418 U.S. 1 (1974); see Burke & Friel, supra note 247, at 95.
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cles used in construction of a building was non-deductible and instead
must be capitalized.- They then suggest that the consumed fertilizer
in Rojas was analogous to the truck depreciation in Idaho Power.2;9
Perhaps, but I think not. Granted, fertilizer contributes to the value
existing in the resulting crops, just as the use of the Idaho Power
vehicles contributed to the value of the resulting building. But that
argument can be made with regard to any business expense which is
attributable to future income, whether from sales of products or sales
of services. Idaho Power was a proper decision because it required
the clear reflection of income: a current depreciation deduction grossly
distorted current income and did not coincide with the future income
from the building, if any. 260 Significantly, the court did not base its
decision on a purported need for transactionalaccounting.261 Rather,
the court rested on the ordinary and necessary nature of the expenses,
as stipulated by the government. To expand the Idaho Power holding
as Professors Burke and Friel suggest would result in transactional
accounting - a true and complete match of income and relevant expenses.
In contrast to Idaho Power, deduction of the Rojas fertilizer did
not distort income, and the government did not argue that it failed
to clearly reflect income.262 If it had so argued, then the proper solution
would have been to deny the deduction - not to apply the tax benefit
rule.
Still, the government understandably felt that someone "got away"
with something. That was because section 337 then permitted tax-free
liquidations favorable to the corporation and the shareholders. Section
337 provided a congressional policy-oriented subsidy. It was not an
error and required no correction. Congress, in 1986, changed the policy
by repeal2- of the General Utilities2- doctrine. Arguably, that was a
wise move. But it was the prerogative of Congress, not the courts.

258. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 19.
259. Burke & Friel, sapra note 247, at 95.
260. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 14.
261. Id. at 14-15.
262. Rojas, 90 T.C. at 1096. The government initially argued that the corporation should
have accrued the future crop income to match with the fertilizer deductions. The government
later abandoned the argument in favor of the tax benefit rule. Id.
263. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 631-633, 100 Stat. 2085, 2269-2282
(1986) (amending I.R.C. §§ 336, 337, 1374 (1985)).
264. General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). For a discussion of
the General Utilities doctrine and the 1986 changes, see GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 328-54 (Comm. Print. 1987).
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629

The Tax Court wisely avoided misusing the tax benefit rule to partially
accomplish the result Congress later achieved by repeal. Subsequent
2
to the Burke and Friel article, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Rojas. -

B.

Cunningham and the Allan Case

Professor Cunningham wrote an interesting 1987 article 2- specifically concerning the characterization of income under the tax benefit
rule. She criticized the Tax Court for its 1986 decision in Allan v.

Commissioner.?7 In so doing, she persuasively argued26 that the tax
benefit rule and Commissioner v. Tufts269 are consistent, rather than
antagonistic, as essentially found by the court.20 My criticism of the
article is that it inadequately explains why the rules are consistent

and thus incorrectly criticizes the court. I also criticize the Tax Court,
however, for it was only half-right, and then for the wrong reasons.
The key to understanding the problems presented by Allan involves
first understanding the policy choices made, the promises broken, and

thus the specific errors we are attempting to correct.
1. The Allan Facts
Allan involved an accrual-method partnership 27' which invested in

real estate subject to non-recourse debt. 2 The partnership defaulted
on the debt. 273 Pursuant to the terms of the note, accrued interest
owed to the mortgagee and real estate taxes, which were paid by the

265.

901 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1990).

266. Cunningham, Characterizationof Income Recovered Under the Tax Benefit Doctrine,
7 VA. TAx REV. 121 (1987) [hereinafter Cunningham I]; Ms. Cunningham wrote a second article
on the same topic, criticizing the Eight Circuit affirmation of Allan, Cunningham, Reprise:
Characterizationof Income Recovered Under the Tax Benefit Doctrine, 43 TAX LAW. 121 (1989)
[hereinafter Cunningham II].
267. 86 T.C. 655 (1986), affd, Allan v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1988). I limit
my discussion to the Tax Court opinion because it dealt with both the deduction for taxes paid
as well as the deduction for interest accrued. On appeal, the government conceded the character
issue as to the real estate taxes. Id., 856 F.2d at 1173; Cunningham II, supra note 266, at
130-31. Therefore, the appellate decision dealt only with the interest issue. In her second article
Ms. Cunningham continued to treat the tax and interest issues the same. I disagree. I also
applaud the government for conceding an issue on appeal that it had lost in the trial court.
268. Cunningham I, supra note 266, at 143-52.
269. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 300.
270. See Allan, 86 T.C. at 666-67.
271. Id. at 657.
272. Id. at 656.
273. Id. at 657.
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mortgagee, were added to principal.27 The partnership nevertheless
the propdeducted the liabilities for interest and taxes. 275 Eventually,
6
discharged.2
liability
the
and
foreclosed
was
erty
Pursuant to Tufts, the taxpayer maintained that the discharged
principal, including the capitalized interest and taxes, generated an
amount realized and, thus, capital gain.27 The government insisted
that the discharge was fundamentally inconsistent with the prior accrued deductions and, thus, generated ordinary income.2s The Tax
Court held for the taxpayer, finding that Tufts overshadowed the tax
benefit rule.279
2.

Identification of Policy Choices and Errors

The Tax Court, which has a history of good decisions in the tax
benefit area, was partially correct for the wrong reasons. Both Tufts
and the tax benefit rule are error correction devices. Both are correctly
the result of judicially adopted policy errors. Tufts was necessary
because it counterbalances the judicial error (arguably from the
Crane-0 decision) which allows non-recourse debt to enter basis. The
Supreme Court chose not to overrule Crane, and thus had to create
Tufts.~ Properly viewed, the tax benefit rule is simply a broad term
for a variety of devices used to correct errors generated by judicial
policy choices.
In Allan, two policy choices occurred. The first policy choice involved the deduction for accrued taxes which were owed by the taxpayer, but paid by a third party under circumstances in which the
taxpayer had no real obligation to reimburse the third party. The

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 659. The Tax Court in Allan characterizes the relief of debt as resulting in
capital gain, relying on its prior decision in Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15
(1979), and on the Supreme Court's Tufts decision. Id. at 663. In so doing, the Court explained,
"The inclusion of the amount of the nonrecourse debt in the amount realized pursuant to Tufts
is not based on the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine." Id. That is true, but not the whole
truth. The Tufts Court at footnote 11 explained, "The Commissioner also has chosen not to
characterize the transaction as cancellation of indebtedness. We are not presented with and do
not decide the contours of the cancellation-of-indebtedness doctrine. We note only that our
approach does not fall within certain prior interpretations of that doctrine." Tufts, 461 U.S. at
312.
278. Id. at 664-66.
279. Id. at 666-67.
280. Crane, 331 U.S. at 1. See supra note 117.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
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actual choice, however, was not the allowance of the deduction which was proper - but rather the decision not to recognize income
from the non-recourse borrowing. The second policy choice involved
the allowance of a deduction for accrued interest which the taxpayer
had not paid and did not economically owe because the liability to pay
the interest was non-recourse.
3. Policy Choice One -

the Taxes

Consider the following two examples which demonstrate the nature
of the policy choice:
4. Example Twelve
Taxpayer A owes taxes to the Government, but lacks the funds
to pay them. Taxpayer A borrows cash from Third Party and uses
the money to pay the Government. Taxpayer A secures his obligation
to Third Party with a recourse mortgage on Whiteacre.
5.

Example Thirteen

Taxpayer B owes taxes similar to those owed by A and also lacks
funds. Taxpayer B borrows cash from Third Party but only gives
Third Party a non-recourse obligation secured by a mortgage on Black-

acre.
(a) Example Twelve Explained
Taxpayer A properly may deduct the taxes, whether he uses the
cash or accrual method. The deduction is ordinary. If Third Party

discharges A's debt, A has ordinary income, subject to sections 1082
and 1017.8 If A sells Whiteacre to raise funds to pay the debt, A
has potential capital gain

on the sale. Similarly, if Third Party obtains

282. I.R.C. § 163(a) allows a deduction for interest "paid or accrued." The notion of accrual
is the all-events test, which is met "if all events have occurred which determine the fact of
liability and the amount of such liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy." I.R.C.
§ 461(h)(4). A taxpayer who owes non-recourse interest can hardly be said to have met the
"fact of liability" test. However, as in Crane and Tufts, the courts understandably may pretend
that the test is met. The consequence is that we need a correction device if ultimately we learn
that the taxpayer never pays the debt.
283. I.R.C. § 108 (taxing discharges of indebtedness as ordinary).
284. Section 1017 paired with § 108, permits exclusion of discharge of indebtedness income
in some cases in which the taxpayer elects to give up a tax attribute. See I.R.C. §§ 108(a)-(b),
1017(a).
285. I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222. Actually the taxpayer would have an amount realized from the
sale, which may result in a gain or loss. For my purposes, I need not consider the alternative
scenario which would result in a capital loss. The analysis would be the same.
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Whiteacre in fulfillment of the debt, A has an amount realized equal
to the recourse debt released. This, too, potentially results in capital
gain,2 ' subject to sections 12452 7 and 1250.Note that in whatever manner A satisfies the debt, he has income,
or amount realized, equal to the prior deduction. Note also, however,
that the character of the income will vary depending on how A discharges the debt. If A pays the debt, using employment income, he
has ordinary income from wages. If A sells unrelated capital assets
to generate funds to pay the debt, he has potential capital gain from
the unrelated sales. If A uses funds given to him, he has tax-free
income under section 102.- 9 If the debt is canceled, A has ordinary
income from the discharge. If instead A sells or transfers Whiteacre
to pay the debt, the amount realized and potential income are capital
gain or loss.
If the ultimate income is either capital gain or excludable, the
apparent fundamental inconsistency between the character of the income used to satisfy the debt and the prior ordinary deduction should
not be disturbing. A's tax deductions and recognition of income are
each consistent with economic reality. No correction device should be
applicable because none would be necessary. In fact, A might use
funds generated by a tax-favored transaction to pay obligations which
generated ordinary deductions. But, so what? That is always a potential consequence of section 1202:290 tax-favored income can properly be
used to pay ordinary deductible obligations. For example, a taxpayer
may use capital gain profits from the sale of stock to pay interest on
a home mortgage loan. The gain is preferentially taxed 2 91 while the
expense is fully deductible against ordinary income. That is a consequence of sections 1202,292 102,293 and 1j).2 4 The tax benefit rule should
be irrelevant.

286. I.R.C. § 1221, 1222.
287. I.R.C. § 1245.
288. I.R.C. § 1250.
289. I.R.C. § 102.
290. I.R.C. § 1202 (1986). This section provided for a deduction equal to 60% of a taxpayer's
net capital gain. Id. Although this tax-favored treatment of capital gains does not now exist,
such treatment has been proposed consistently by the Bush Administration. In addition, § 1(j)
subjects net capital gain to a preferential maximum 28% rate.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. I.R.C. § 102.
294. I.R.C. § 1(j).
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(b) Example Thirteen Explained
Example thirteen should be viewed similarly. Taxpayer B used
non-recourse funds to pay an ordinary obligation. Again, whether B
used the cash or accrual method should not matter because the debt
is both actually owed and actually paid. However, the non-recourse
borrowing raises difficult issues. Critically, Taxpayer B actually pays
the taxes to the government, whether he writes the check or whether
Third Party does it for him.
Traditionally we have viewed the non-recourse borrowing of funds
as non-income-producing. It is well settled that recourse borrowing
does not generate income because it is counter-balanced by an obligation to repay. Non-recourse borrowing, however, does not have the
same counter-weight. 295 Economically, non-recourse borrowing could
be viewed as income-producing because it.often essentially accelerates
gain from the future disposal of the property. However, this acceleration occurs only if the taxpayer ultimately disposes of the property
in a transaction related to the satisfaction of the non-recourse debt.
If, instead, the taxpayer pays the debt and retains the property, no
acceleration would really have occurred. Thus, any prior treatment of
the non-recourse debt as real taxpayer investment would be justified.
Therefore, it is appropriate to defer recognition of the potential accelerated gain until we know whether any gain really occurred.
Two scenarios are possible to illustrate the acceleration of income
potential from non-recourse debt.
(1) Scenario One: Non-Tufts
Taxpayer borrows money non-recourse and spends it on matters
unrelated to the acquisition of the property securing the debt. Ultimately, taxpayer sells the property for an amount in excess of the
non-recourse liability. Any gain resulting from the transaction is real
in the sense that taxpayer actually pockets the excess. Similarly, in
the taxpayer's eyes the non-recourse debt is also real in that he had
a motive to pay it.
In such a scenario, deferral of income recognition from the borrowing year to the disposition year is a timing policy choice. The character
of such real income should be capital because that is what the facts
ultimately justify. We originally defer the income from the borrowing
year for two reasons. First, we want to see if an acceleration really
occurred; i.e., did the borrower ultimately pay the debt by disposing

295.

See Bittker, supra note 118.
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of the property. Second, if an acceleration occurred, we want to see
if the accelerated income is real. If it is, then the use of the funds in
the borrowing year should be irrelevant. In such a scenario, Taxpayer
B essentially stands in the same position as Taxpayer A because he
ultimately would have a true incentive to pay the non-recourse debt.
Thus, B should have the same opportunity as A would to use tax-favored income to pay expenses which are deductible in full.
(2)

Scenario Two: Modified Tufts

Taxpayer again borrows money non-recourse and spends it on matters unrelated to the acquisition of the property securing the debt.
Ultimately, taxpayer sells the property for an amount less than the
non-recourse liability. Any "gain" would not be economically real, because the taxpayer would not be relieved of an obligation for which
he had an incentive to pay. Thus, I refer to this future "gain" as
"fictitious gain."
The Supreme Court properly recognized in Tufts that we must
recognize such "fictitious gain" to counter-balance the prior treatment
of the non-recourse debt as real debt. In Tufts, the original treatment
of the debt as real resulted in basis because the taxpayer used the
funds to acquire the property. Thus, the Tufts recognition of a "fictitious amount realized" is transactionally consistent. Had the Tufts taxpayer received an ordinary benefit from the prior inclusion in basis
- such as depreciation - sections 1245296 and 1250297 would preclude
any potential transactional character inconsistency to the extent Congress saw fit.
In my second scenario, as in Allan, the borrowing of the funds
non-recourse to pay the taxes was essentially an acceleration of future
"fictitious gain." Unlike Tufts, however, this taxpayer used the borrowed proceeds as he saw fit - in this case to pay the ordinary
obligations. He did not use the funds to purchase the specific property
related to the non-recourse debt.
As shown in the Tenth Example above, however, what the taxpayer did with the funds should not matter. Instead, we should focus
on the "gain." Perhaps I overstate the case when I call the gain
"fictitious." Perhaps there is some reality to it. In essence, the non-recourse borrowing is a put. 29 , The borrower locks in a price at which

296. I.R.C. § 1245.
297. I.R.C. § 1250.
298. A "put" is a type of option contract which "obligates the seller of the contract to take
delivery of the [property] and pay the specified price to the owner of the option within the time
limit of the contract." S. BOLTEN, SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 493
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he can force the lender to buy. In this view, it is still appropriate to
defer recognition of any locked-in gain until later because of the possibility that the borrower may still pay the debt, and thus cause the
put to evaporate. As above, we would then treat it as if it never
happened. If instead the taxpayer transfers the property to satisfy
the debt, he then would recognize his locked-in gain, which necessarily
would be characterized by reference to the property transferred rather
than by reference to the expenditure of the borrowed funds.
Thus, with regard to the taxes in Allan the Tax Court was correct:
the deduction was ordinary, while the subsequent gain was capital.
However, the reason is not that Tufts overrides the tax benefit rule.
Instead, both Tufts and the tax benefit rule apply, because both actually are of the same thing: devices to correct transactional errors
resulting from policy choices and broken promises.
With regard to the taxes, the policy choice was not the allowance
of the deduction - which was real because the taxes were both actually
owed and actually paid. Instead, the policy choice involved deferring
the recognition of the accelerated gain until we knew whether it really
existed. Once we knew, from the foreclosure, that in fact the taxpayer
used a "put" to accelerate gain, it was time to recognize it. Critically,
the policy choice involved timing rather than character. The locked-in
gain was real, although the ultimate paper gain appeared "fictitious."
4. Policy Choice Two: the Interest
Analysis of the Allan interest deduction and subsequent gain is
more tricky. In this instance, the taxpayer did not really borrow
anything, did not accrue anything, and did not pay anything. It was
all a fiction. The interest was not owed, because the obligation to pay
it was non-recourse.2 9 Note that in contrast, the obligation to pay the
taxes to the government was real. Similarly, the taxpayer did not pay
the interest; instead the taxpayer merely promised (to the extent that
a non-recourse promise is a promise) to pay it later. In contrast the
taxes were actually paid, albeit with funds borrowed non-recourse.
Also, no funds were really borrowed with respect to the interest. On
paper the principal increased, but the taxpayer did not promise to
pay it and the lender did not disburse any money. In contrast, with
regard to the taxes, the lender actually disbursed the funds.300

(1972). Analogizing the non-recourse obligation to a put, the borrower would own the option to
force the lender to buy the property for the amount of the debt.
299. Allan, 86 T.C. at 658.
300. Id. at 657. On appeal, the government correctly argued that the advances for interest
did not create a "true loan." Allan, 856 F.2d at 1173. The court found otherwise. Id. at 1173-74.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

IVAl 42

(a) The Cause of the Dilemma: A Burgess/Battlestein Problem
The "interest" aspect of Allan raises the familiar problem illustrated by the Burgess v. Commissionee'o' and Battlestein v. Internal
Revenue Service302 cases. Both involved cash method taxpayers, which
presents some difficulty relating them to Allan, which involved an
accrual method taxpayer.30 Nevertheless, the cases are relevant.
Burgess owed interest which was due and which was deductible if
paid. He borrowed additional funds from the lender to whom he owed
the interest. He deposited them in an account which included other
monies, he waited a short period of time, and then he paid them to
the lender to satisfy the interest obligation.304 Over the objections of
the government, the Tax Court allowed Burgess an interest deduction. ' , The holding rested on the fact that he actually paid the interest,
albeit with funds borrowed from the person to whom he owed the
interest. Had he borrowed the money from an unrelated third party,
no one would question the deduction.
Battlestein involved very similar facts, with a critical difference.
Battlestein borrowed the money and immediately repaid it as interest:
he merely exchanged checks. There was no other money to mix it
with and no time lag3oe In a narrowly divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit
7
denied the deduction."3
These two cases have long puzzled students and practitioners. They
appear to draw an arbitrary line. That is a fair analysis, because they
do draw an arbitrary line. However, the line is necessary and at the
proper place. Why? Because of the policy choice which permits the
cash method of accounting.3° Inherently the cash method is flawed.
It is less transactional than the accrual method, because it merely
looks at receipts and payments, rather than earning and owing. It
does not even attempt to satisfy the matching principle of accounting.
Yet, we allow it because of its simplicity.

301. 8 T.C. 47 (1947).
302. 631 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1980).
303. Allan, 86 T.C. at 658.
304. Burgess, 8 T.C. at 48.
305. Id. at 50.
306. Battlestein, 631 F.2d at 1183.
307. Id. at 1184-85. Twenty-four judges considered the decision at the Fifth Circuit. Id. at
1182-83. Fourteen joined the majority opinion denying the deduction, while ten dissented. Id.
at 1185. Remarkably, the Eighth Circuit saw the relationship of ,gattlestein to Allan, but failed
to grasp the distinctions. Allan, 856 F.2d at 1174.
308. I.R.C. § 446(c)(1). This provision permits the cash method of accounting. Id.
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Because the cash method depends upon payment as the key factor
in deductions, it necessarily permits deduction of expenses paid with
borrowed funds: they are actually paid. However, it also necessarily
does not permit deduction of expenses which the taxpayer merely
promises to pay: they are not paid. That presents the dilemma of
drawing a line between a payment and a promise. If a third party
lends the funds used to make the payment, then we can easily recognize
the payment because it is real. However, when the lender of the funds
is also the recipient of the payment, reality is less clear. The court
understandably felt that time, combined with pre-existing funds, adds
enough reality to such a transaction; thus, the Burgess decision.
Likewise, the mere form of exchanging checks with no substance whatever lacks almost all reality; hence, the Battlestein decision.
(b)

Relationship to Allan

Although Allan involved an accrual taxpayer, the problem is similar. The taxpayer did not pay anything because there was not even
the semblance of exchanged checks. Critically, the taxpayer also did
not owe anything because the obligation was non-recourse. Had the
taxpayer borrowed the funds from a third party, that would have
been sufficient substance to recognize the interest obligation: if he had
been willing to borrow real funds to pay the interest, then the interest
obligation likewise must have been real. However, the Allan taxpayer
did not do so.
For some reason, not explained in the Allan decision, the government did not question the accrual of the interest deduction. While
that could be viewed as an error and correctable as an error (through
an amended return or notice of deficiency), I prefer to see it as a
policy choice. We are willing to view the obligation to pay the interest
as real, if the taxpayer promises that it will ultimately pay the interest.
Critically, however, we need not recognize the capitalization of the
interest as a payment. As in Battlestein, that is a paper transaction
without any substance.
Therefore, the interest deduction and alleged capitalization does
not generate a Tufts issue on foreclosure. In reality, the interest was
not capitalized - it was deferred. The ultimate release of the obligation
constituted a broken promise by the taxpayer: the government allowed
the taxpayer a deduction on the promise the taxpayer would pay the
interest, but the taxpayer never paid the interest. Thus, under my
view of the tax benefit rule, it must "repay" the deduction by recognition of ordinary income. Had, instead, the taxpayer fulfilled the
promise either by paying the interest in cash or by surrendering
property with sufficient value to pay the interest, then the promise

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

63

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

would not have been broken. In such a case, any amount realized
would have been capital.
5.

Summary of Allan Analysis

With regard to the taxes, the deduction and capitalization were
proper. The policy choice involved merely the timing of the accelerated
income, if any. The character was necessarily capital because it involved deferred accelerated gain from the sale of a capital asset. Crane
and Tufts were the proper correction devices. Because Crane would
treat the debt as real initially, Tufts treats it as real at the end of
the transaction.
With regard to the interest, the deduction was questionable and
the capitalization was improper. The policy choice involved allowing
the deduction in exchange for the promise that the interest would be
paid. Because it was never paid, the proper correction device is the
tax benefit rule which would create income to offset the deduction.
Necessarily it would be of the same character.
6. Crane and the Forgotten Footnote 6
To be complete, an analysis of Allan should at least observe the
remarkably similar facts of Crane,3 09 perhaps the most important of
all tax cases. Crane inherited property subject to non-recourse debt,
which included capitalized unpaid interest owed by the decedent. A
cash method taxpayer, Crane deducted some subsequent interest she
paid and also capitalized other interest she did not pay.3 10
When she sold the property, the purchaser assumed not only the
principal debt but also the capitalized interest originally owed by the
decedent as well as that owed by Crane.311 These facts differ from
Allan because Crane used the cash method while Allan used the accrual. Thus, Crane never deducted the interest, as had Allan. That
difference, however, is unimportant because it only relates to the
timing of the interest deduction. The critical issue in Allan was the
character of the deduction and the amount realized.
Remarkably, the Supreme Court in footnote six of Crane stated
that the amount realized on the disposition of the property did not
include relief of the capitalized interest.312 The Court explained that
the government had stipulated that recognition of any income would

309.
310.
311.
312.

Crane, 331 U.S. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4 n.6.
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have necessitated imputation of a deduction, which would have been
a wash. The statement is remarkable not only in that the government
would stipulate such nonsense, but also that the Court would buy it.
Had the assumed interest resulted in gain, such gain would have
been capital (at least today) and would have been recognized in the
year of disposition. The corresponding deduction, however, would have
been ordinary, if justifiable at all. Also, it would have been allowable
in the year of payment rather than in the year of disposition. Thus,
the income and deduction could not, at least not always, wash. A full
discussion of Crane's footnote six is beyond this article; however, a
reader should at least question whether Crane would be entitled to
deduct interest accrued by the decedent and whether such a deduction
would arise prior to payment. 313 Also, would the assumption of the
debt by the purchaser be a sufficient payment? 314 Would payment by
the purchaser have generated Crane's deduction? Would the nonrecognition of amount realized on the disposition affect Crane's subsequent
deduction of the interest?315 Would such a deduction despite the prior
nonrecognition be a fundamentally inconsistent event under Bliss
Dairy?16

While I choose to leave the above questions for a later article, I
nevertheless note that the Allan Tax Court also chose not to answer
them. This criticism of the court is significant because the Tax Court
found an ordinary deduction followed by capital gain, while the Supreme Court in a famous case with quite similar facts found a wash.
At least a cite distinguishing or finessing footnote six in Crane (as I
admittedly do) was warranted.
C. Joyce and Del Cotto
Professors Joyce and Del Cotto wrote an interesting 1984 Tax Law
Review article which attempted to develop a unified theory of tax
benefit. 317 The authors argue that all double deduction and double

313. I.R.C. § 691(b).
314. See Rev. Rul. 78-38, 1978-1 C.B. 67 where the Treasury Department stated that a
taxpayer who used a bank credit card to make a charitable contribution was entitled to a
deduction in the year the charge was made regardless of when the bank was paid. The Treasury
Department reasoned that the credit card holder's substitution of the bank as the payor was
equivalent to the use of borrowed funds to make the charitable contribution.
315. In Cooledge v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1325, 1328 (1939), the court concluded that
a seller of real property was entitled to a deduction for accrued but unpaid interest and taxes
when included in the purchaser's assumption of such amounts as part of his amount realized on
the sale.
316. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
317. Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 473.
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exclusion situations, if not covered by clear congressional mandate,
are resolvable by the Hillsboro "fundamental inconsistency" standard.:318
The authors' analysis proves too difficult to apply. First they classify all tax benefit situations into four groups: 1) deduction/deduction,
2) deduction/exclusion, 3) exclusion/deduction, and 4) exclusion/exclusion.1'1 Using the language of Hillsboro, they point out that if the
second prong of each class is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the
congressional intent permitting the first prong, then the tax benefit
rule will disallow the second prong.320 Many, if not most, of the authors'
examples, however, are resolvable by use of various fundamental tax
rules, without resort to a judicial creation and complication such as
the tax benefit rule.
This is an important criticism of their unified theory. When general
tax principles - both accounting and economic - resolve an apparent
problem, the system is not subject to distortion or inadequate correction because the solution stems from economic reality. In addition,
the application of general principles such as the basis mechanism, or
the Glenshaw Glass321 "accession to wealth clearly realized" test, avoids
judicial whim and judicial errors. In contrast to these authors' unified
theory, my thesis could be denominated a unified theory of error
correction. We need non-traditional economic or accounting devices
for error correction only when the tax system is used to achieve special
policy goals. Such special goals create the risk of economic distortion.
Thus, Congress must seek to provide for inconsistencies in each instance it uses the system to achieve policy goals. Similarly, the courts
must seek to provide for inconsistencies in each instance they use the
system to achieve policy goals. However, such special provisions need
not be reconciled with nor unified with traditional economic or accounting correction devices, such as the basis mechanism. Sometimes legal
provisions serve different purposes and are not reconcilable other than
that they are just different.
For example, the authors' first group in their unified theory includes potential double deductions. As they point out, if a taxpayer
"has deducted a repair cost under section 162, the expenditure cannot
again be deducted as a loss under section 165 or as depreciation under
section 167 or 168. If T[axpayer], an accrual basis taxpayer, has deducted accrued interest, the payment of the interest cannot also be

318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 479.
Id. at 474-76.
Id. at 479.
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss4/1

66

Willis: The Tax Benefit Rule: A Different View and a Unified Theory of Er
TAX BENEFIT RULE: ERROR CORRECTION

deducted."3

All that is fine and true, but it has nothing to do with

a judicial error correction device. The tax code allows repair and
interest expenses because they are proper negative factors in
"economic income." If an error occurs because of a double deduction,
application of the tax benefit rule would confuse the situation; instead,
one of four possible solutions is preferable: 1) the taxpayer files an
amended return; 2) the government issues a notice of deficiency; 3)
the statute of limitations bars correction or 4) the mitigation provisions
reopen the prior year to allow correction. Applying the tax benefit
rule confuses the situation as to the nature of the error and as to the
proper method of correction. When a taxpayer deducts an item twice,
at least one of the deductions is erroneous - not because of some
judicial rule, but rather because it simply is erroneous under our
system of accounting and economics. Thus, the wrong deduction should
be corrected, subject to the statute of limitations and the mitigation
provisions. Application of the tax benefit rule also risks erroneous
correction of the wrong deduction in the wrong year, subject to the
wrong collateral effects. Therefore, unification of such error correction
with the tax benefit rule accomplishes nothing but artificial reconciliation and confusion.
However, as Joyce and Del Cotto correctly point out, in some
situations the system does not work so neatly. The Skelly Oil323 facts

are an example. In Skelly Oil, the taxpayer used percentage depletion
on mineral revenues to exclude income. In a later year, the taxpayer
refunded some of the revenue never taxed. The Court refused a full
deduction for the refund to the extent the revenue was never taxed.-A
This result is consistent with the Hillsboro "fundamental inconsistency" standard. The Joyce and Del Cotto article, however, fails to
identify why it is consistent. It is consistent because Congress, which
for policy reasons desired to aid the domestic energy industry, allowed
percentage depletion in an amount greater than economic reality justifies. As I maintained earlier, any such tax policy necessitates an
error correction device to resolve situations in which the benefiting
taxpayer fails to fulfill his promises implicit in the granting of the tax
benefit. The authors' error is to compare such a situation with those
which involve no policy-oriented deductions or exclusions.

322. Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 474.
323. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969). The authors discuss Skelly
extensively. Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 479-84.
324. Skelly, 394 U.S. at 684-86.
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The authors' second group involves deductions followed by exclusions. 35 The classic - and unfortunate - example is Alice Phelan
Sullivan.326 Ms. Sullivan gave property to a charity with the condition
that if the charity failed to use it for a particular purpose, then the
property would revert to the donor. Ms. Sullivan deducted the value
of the property as a charitable contribution. Upon the ultimate reversion, she declared no income. The court found income after applying
the tax benefit rule. Joyce and Del Cotto agree.32 They were all right
for the wrong reasons.
Assuming the original charitable deduction was proper, Ms. Sullivan retained an asset with a zero basis - the right of reversion. As
a result of the later event - the reversion - she had an accession
to wealth clearly realized. The wealth was the value of the property,
and the realization event was the exchange of the right of reversion
for the property. Again, general tax principles resolve the situation.
The tax benefit rule is unnecessary. 3 28 Application of the Rule in such
a situation again promotes confusion and risks judicial mistakes, such
as Unvert.
The third group proffered by the authors3- is similarly unconvincing. The exclusion/deduction example stems from a case in which a
utility taxpayer excluded customer contributions toward the construction of new facilities.-O The court denied depreciation deductions on
the facilities. A similar case denied a deduction for the repayment of
previously excluded sick pay.-' Although the tax benefit rule would
provide a satisfactory answer in either case, so what? Assuming both
exclusions were correct, neither taxpayer should have a tax cost basis
in the item. Thus, neither taxpayer could acquire any further tax
benefit without making an error. Such an error should be treated as
an error and corrected, subject to the statute of limitations and mitigation. If, instead the exclusions were incorrect, then the later deductions would be proper and should be allowed. In such a case, the
erroneous exclusion should be corrected, subject to the statute of
limitations and mitigation. Application of the tax benefit rule would
promote confusion and risk erroneous correction.

325. Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 474, 488-99D.
326. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
327. Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 274.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 160-67.
329. Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 499-502.
330. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943) (discussed in Del Cotto
& Joyce, supra note 1, at 499-500).
331. See Hintz v. Commissioner, 712 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1983), discussed in Del Cotto &
Joyce, supra note 1, at 475-76 n.11.
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The fourth group involves double exclusions. 2 The authors initially
analyze Kirby Lumber Co.,m which they argue "established the principle that a discharge of indebtedness is gross income. '"- They further
argue that this is a tax benefit case because exclusion of a discharge
would be fundamentally inconsistent with the earlier exclusion of the
borrowing. Perhaps so, but again, so what? Borrowing is excluded
because it is not an accession to wealth. Discharge is included, and
not excluded, because it is an accession to wealth. Kirby Lumber Co.
did not establish this, it merely recognized what economists and accountants already knew.
With regard to the fourth group, the authors also discuss Crane
and Tufts as tax benefit cases. In this instance they are correct. As
I discussed earlier, both cases stem from a judicial and entrenched
error - allowing basis for non-recourse investment. The error continues in the system for policy reasons - denial of basis for non-recourse debt could wreak havoc in many industries. Thus, this artificial
policy goal/error demands the artificial correction of a tax benefit-type
rule.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The traditional formulation of the tax benefit rule by the Tax Court
is mistaken, but harmless. It achieved the correct result for the wrong
reasons. It also properly excluded correction of errors, again for the
wrong reasons.
The formulation by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
both mistaken and harmful. By rejecting the erroneous deduction exception, the court precluded application of mitigation - a better correction device.
The formulation by the Supreme Court is partially correct, partially
mistaken, and generally harmful. The Court correctly recognized the
need for such a rule, but then broadly formulated one that would
apply to unnecessary scenarios. When the Court correctly applied the
Rule, it achieved poor results by achieving only partial correction.
In short, the tax benefit rule is generally unnecessary. When necessary, it is a bad rule. It should be limited and re-designed.

332.
333.
334.

Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 502-03.
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 1, at 476.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

69

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 1

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss4/1

70

